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Brief Searches & Stops: Terry Stops - State Survey

Compiled by John O'Tuel, 7/11/95 to 7/18/95

State Statute Cite Date Enacted Content of Interaction Between Police and Citizen
Alabama Ala. Code 15-5-30 et seq. 1966 Police officer may demand name address, explanation of actions; police officer may also search for weapon with reasonable belief
Alaska Ak. St. 28.35.182 before 1984  
Arizona A.R.S. § 13-3883 1990 Amendment added necessary section Police officer may stop citizen as reasonably necessary to investigate traffic violation committed in officer's presence
Arkansas A.C.A. 16-81-203 et seq. Apr. 9, 1969 Police officer may stop citizen as is "reasonably necessary to identify or determine the lawfulness of such person's conduct"; police officer may even use reasonable force; police officer may search for weapon if there is reasonable suspicion that suspect is armed and presents danger to officer or others; police officer may even detain witness to felony to get name, address, and information regarding felony; no detentions may last longer than fifteen minutes
California West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 833 et seq. Stop statute: 1982
Frisk statute: 1957
Police officer may detain person if he has reasonable cause to believe person has violated firearms provision; needs specific and articulable facts; may search under this statute but not "at the person's residence or place of business absent a search warrant or other reasonable cause to detain or search"; the frisk statute allows police officer to search suspect for weapons with reasonable cause if he already has legal cause to arrest
Colorado C.R.S.A. 16-3-103 1972 Police officer may demand name, address, identification, and explanation of actions; police officer may also conduct pat-down search for weapons with reasonable suspicion for his own safety
Connecticut     Case Law
Delaware 11 Del. C. 1902 et seq. 1951 Police officer may demand name, address, business abroad and where citizen is going; Police officer may also search for weapon with reasonable belief; total time of detention (w/o arrest) may not exceed two hours
D.C.     Case Law
Florida West's F.S.A. § 901.151 October 1, 1969 Police officer may investigate identity of suspect and demand explanation of actions giving rise to reasonable suspicion; detention must be confined to stopping place and immediate vicinity; weapons frisk allowed with probable cause
Georgia     Case Law
Hawaii H.R.S. § 200-63 H.R.S. § 261-92 H.R.S. § 803-4 Vessel - 1991 Aircraft - 1981 Proximity - 1869 Hawaii has no true statutory "Terry Stop" provision. However, police officers may detain citizens on vessels and aircraft with a reasonable suspicion that they have no right to be on the vessel or aircraft; the officer may then demand the name, address, and the person's business on the vessel or aircraft. Another statute authorizes the arrest of persons acting suspiciously in close proximity to a felony scene with only the reasonable suspicion of the officer.
Idaho     Case Law
Illinois 725 Il.C.S. 5/107-14 725 Il.C.S. 5/108-1.01 Effective since at least August 21, 1968 Police officer may demand name, address and explanation of actions; detention and questioning must take place in vicinity of where citizen was stopped; officer may search for weapons with reasonable suspicion that he or another is in danger of attack
Indiana     Case Law
Iowa     Case Law
Kansas K.S.A. § 22-2402 July 1, 1970 Police officer may demand name, address and explanation of actions; officer may frisk suspect if officer reasonably suspects that his personal safety is in danger
Kentucky     Case Law
Louisiana L.S.A.-C.Cr.P. Art. 215.1 1968 Police officer may demand name, address and explanation of actions; officer may frisk suspect if officer reasonably suspects that his personal safety is in danger
Maine 17A M.R.S.A. § 15-A (2) 37B M.R.S.A. § 1010 1987 Sabotage (trespass) statute: 1954 Police officer may demand name and address; failure to give name and address or intentional misleading of officer as to that information is a misdemeanor; officer may detain for up to two hours to verify information; officer may "pat-down" if he reasonably believes it is necessary for his safety. Sabotage (trespass) statute: police officer may demand name, address and person's business in that place.
Maryland Md. Code 1957, Art. 27, § 542 Sabotage (trespass) statute: 1941 Sabotage (trespass) statute: police officer may demand name, address and person's business in that place. Otherwise, "Terry stops" are handled by case law.
Massachusetts M.G.L.A. 41 § 98 Some form of the statute has been on the books since 1851. Frisk section added in 1967 Officer may demand of suspect "their business abroad and whither they are going"; officer may search for dangerous weapons if he reasonably suspects a danger to his safety.
Michigan M.C.L.A. 257.1542 M.C.L.A. 281.1161 Snowmobile: 1994 Vessel: 1948 Snowmobile and vessel statutes: officer may demand name and address and certificate of registration; officer may inspect snowmobile or vessel if necessary. Otherwise, "Terry stops" are handled by case law.
Minnesota     Case Law
Mississippi Miss. Code 1972, § 43-21-305 Juvenile stop: July 1, 1979 Juveniles may be stopped by officer if officer has probable cause to believe youth is under jurisdiction of juvenile court; officer may demand name, address and explanation of actions. Otherwise, "Terry stops" are handled by case law.
Missouri V.A.M.S. 84.710 1943 Officer may demand "name, address, business abroad and whither he is going" of suspect; officer may search for weapons if there is reasonable ground to believe he is in danger
Montana M.C.A. 46-5-401 et seq. 1973 Officer may demand name and address of suspect; officer may search for weapons if officer has reasonable cause to suspect that person is armed and dangerous to officer or others; detention may not last longer than necessary to carry out purpose of stop
Nebraska Neb. Rev. St. § 29-829 1965 Officer may demand name, address and explanation of actions; officer may search for dangerous weapons if officer reasonably suspects he is in danger
Nevada N.R.S. 171.123 et seq. 1969 Officer may ascertain person's identity and "the suspicious circumstances surrounding his presence abroad" but suspect doesn't have to answer questions other than about identity; detention may last no longer than 60 minutes; detention must remain confined to immediate vicinity of where stop was made; officer may frisk if he reasonably believes he is in danger
New Hampshire R.S.A. § 594:2 et seq. R.S.A. § 649:8 1941 Sabotage (trespass) statute: Nov. 1, 1973 Officer may demand name, address, business abroad and destination; officer may also frisk if he reasonably believes he is in danger. Sabotage trespass statute: officer may demand name, address and business in the place.
New Jersey     Case Law
New Mexico N.M.S.A. 1978, § 30-21-3 Sabotage (trespass) statute: 1963 Sabotage trespass statute: officer may demand name, address and business in the place. Otherwise, "Terry stops" are handled by case law.
New York McKinney's C.P.L. § 140.50 1970 Officer may demand name, address and explanation of suspect's conduct; officer may "pat-down" if he reasonably suspects he is in danger
North Carolina     Case Law
North Dakota N.D.C.C., 29-29-21 1969 Officer may demand name, address and explanation of actions; officer may frisk if he reasonably believes he is in danger
Ohio     Case Law
Oklahoma 21 Okl. St. Ann. § 1265.8 Sabotage (trespass) statute: 1941 Officer may demand name, address and business in the place. Other than sabotage statute, "Terry stops" are handled by case law.
Oregon O.R.S. § 131.615 O.R.S. § 131.625 1973 Officer may make reasonable inquiry; detention may only last for reasonable time and may not exceed vicinity of stop; officer may frisk if he reasonably suspects that the suspect is armed and poses danger
Pennsylvania     Case Law
Rhode Island R.I. Gen. Laws 1956, § 12-7-1 et seq. 1941 Officer may demand name, address, business abroad and destination; detention may not exceed two hours; officer may frisk if he reasonably believes he is in danger. (In 1973, an act substantially the same was enacted giving the same powers to national guardsmen, sergeant or above, who were called on emergency duty)
South Carolina     Case Law
South Dakota     Case Law
Tennessee     Case Law
Texas   Warrantless Arrest Statute: 1965 Case Law, although Texas courts have addressed temporary detentions in reference to their warrantless arrest statute.
Utah U.C.A. 1953 § 77-7-15 et seq. 1980 Police officer may demand citizen's name, address and an explanation of his/her actions; police officer may also frisk for weapon(s) if he has reasonable belief that he or any other person may be in danger
Vermont 13 V.S.A. § 3439 23 V.S.A. § 1012 Sabotage (trespasss) statute: 1941 Motor Vehicle Stop statute: March 1, 1973 Sabotage statute: officer may demand name, address and suspect's business in that place. Motor vehicle statute: officer may demand name and address of driver and owner of vehicle; officer may also demand license and registration.
Virginia Va. Code 1950, § 19.2-81.2 (A) Correctional Inst. Statute: 1976 Correctional Inst. Statute: correctional officer may detain person upon reasonable suspicion of aiding or abetting prisoner. Otherwise, "Terry stops" are handled by case law.
Washington West's R.C.W.A. 7.80.060 West's R.C.W.A. 46.61.020 Civil Infraction Statute: Jan. 1, 1989 Motor Vehicle Statute: Feb. 8, 1961 Civil Infraction Statute: officer may demand name, address, date of birth and ID card of suspect; officer may detain for a reasonable time to ascertain identity. Motor Vehicle Statute: officer may demand name and address of driver and owner of vehicle; officer may demand license, insurance card and registration.
West Virginia     Case Law
Wisconsin W.S.A. 968.24 et seq. W.S.A. 23.58 et seq. July 1, 1970 Conservation statute: May 29, 1976 [Both statutes] officer may demand name, address and explanation of actions; detention may only be for reasonable time and must remain in immediate vicinity of stop; officer may frisk if he reasonably suspects that he is in danger
Wyoming     Case Law
 


STATE SURVEY

 

Brief Searches and Stops: Terry Stops; Content of State Statutes

Compiled by John O'Tuel, 7/11/95 to 7/18/95

 

 


Classic "Terry Stop" Statutes: name, address, and explanation of actions; frisk Classic "Terry Stop" Statutes with detention time and/or space limitations Sabotage Trespass Statutes State only has vehicle stop statutes Miscellaneous Case Law
Alabama

California

Colorado

Kansas

Louisiana

Massachusetts

Missouri

Nebraska

New Hampshire

New York

North Dakota

Utah

Arkansas

Delaware

Florida

Illinois

Maine

Montana

Nevada

Oregon

Rhode Island

Wisconsin

Maine

Maryland

New Hampshire

New Mexico

Okalahoma

Vermont

Alaska

Arizona

Hawaii

Michigan

Vermont1

Washington2

Mississippi1

Virginia2

Washington3

Connecticut

D.C.

Georgia

Idaho

Indiana

Iowa

Kentucky

Minnesota

New Jersey

North Carolina

Ohio

Pennsylvania

South Carolina

South Dakota

Tennessee

Texas

West Virginia

Wyoming

1 Vermont also has a sabotage trespass statute.

2 Washington has a civil infraction detention statute in addition to the motor vehicle stop statute. The statute allows the officer to demand the suspect's name, address, date of birth and ID card, but the officer may only detain the suspect for a reasonable time in order to ascertain the suspect's identity.

3 Mississippi has a detention statute for juveniles.

4 Virginia has a statute enabling correctional officers to detain persons suspected of aiding or abetting prisoners.

 

 


STATE SURVEY

 

Brief Searches and Stops: Terry Stops; Enactment of State Statutes

Compiled by John O'Tuel, 7/11/95 to 7/18/95

 

Before 1968 1968-1973 After 1973
Alabama

California1

Delaware

Maine2

Maryland

Massachusetts

Michigan3

Missouri

New Hampshire

New Mexico

Okalahoma

Rhode Island

Vermont4

Washington5

 

Arkansas

Colorado

Florida

Illinois

Kansas

Louisiana

Montana

Nevada

New Hampshire

New York

North Dakota

Oregon

Vermont4

Wisconsin

 

Arizona

California1

Hawaii

Maine2

Michigan3

Mississippi

Utah

Virginia

Washington5

 

 

1 California's frisk statute was on the books in 1957; its stop statute was on the books in 1982.

2 Maine's sabotage statute was on the books in 1954; its stop and frisk statute was on the books in 1987.

3 Michigan's vessel stop statute was on the books in 1948; its snowmobile stop statute was added in 1994.

4 Vermont's sabotage statute was on the books in 1941; its motor vehicle stop statute was on the books in 1971.

5 Washington's motor vehicle stop statute was enacted on Feb. 8, 1961; its civil infraction stop statute was enacted on Jan. 1, 1989.

 

Alabama

 

"A sheriff or other officer acting as sheriff, his deputy or any constable, acting within their respective counties, any marshal, deputy marshal or policeman of any incorporated city or town within the limits of the county or any highway patrolman or state trooper may stop any person abroad in a public place whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit a felony or other public offense and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his actions." Ala. Code 1975, § 15-5-30. [derivation note: (Acts 1966, Ex. Sess., No. 157, p. 183, § 1.)]

"When a sheriff or other officer acting as sheriff, his deputy or any constable, acting within their respective counties, any marshal, deputy marshal or policeman of any incorporated city or town within the limits of the county or any highway patrolman or state trooper has stopped a person for questioning pursuant to this article and reasonably suspects that he is in danger of life or limb, he may search such person for a dangerous weapon. If such officer finds such a weapon or any other thing, the possession of which may constitute a crime, he may take and keep it until the completion of the questioning, at which time he shall either return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest such person." Ala. Code 1975, § 15-5-31.

 

Alaska

 

"(a) A person driving or operating a vehicle or motor vehicle, or operating an aircraft or watercraft, shall stop as soon as practical and in a reasonably safe manner under the circumstances, if requested or signalled to do so for a lawful purpose by a peace officer. (b) If the peace officer is driving or operating a vehicle or motor vehicle or is operating an aircraft or watercraft when making the request or giving the signal to stop, the peace officer's vehicle, motor vehicle, aircraft, or watercraft must be marked appropriately so that a reasonable person would recognize it as one related to law enforcement, or it must meet lighting and audible signalling requirements of law for law enforcement vehicles. If the peace officer is not driving or operating a vehicle or motor vehicle, or operating an aircraft or watercraft, the officer shall wear the uniform of office or display a badge or other symbol of authority so as to be reasonably identifiable as a peace officer. (c) A person who knowingly fails to stop in violation of (a) of this section is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. (d) In this section (1) "lawful purpose" includes making an arrest or issuing a citation, preventing personal injury or property damage in an emergency, and investigating a situation when the peace officer has a reasonable suspicion that imminent public danger exists or that serious harm has recently occurred; (2) "signal" means a hand motion, audible mechanical or electronic noise device, visual light device, or combination of them, used in a manner that a reasonable person would understand to mean that the peace officer intends that the person stop." Ak. St. § 28.35.182. [in operation since at least 1984, derivation note cites § 1 ch 66 SLA 1984, provisions were redrafted and amended at that time]

 

Arizona

 

"A peace officer may stop and detain a person as is reasonably necessary to investigate an actual or suspected violation of any traffic law committed in the officer's presence and may serve a copy of the traffic complaint for any alleged civil or criminal traffic violation. A peace officer who serves a copy of the traffic complaint shall do so within a reasonable time of the alleged criminal or civil traffic violation." A.R.S. § 13-3883 (B). [derivation note: Formerly § 13-1403. Amended by Laws 1967, Ch. 75, § 1; Laws 1970, Ch. 176, § 1; Laws 1972, Ch. 77, § 1. Renumbered as § 13-3883 and amended by Laws 1977, Ch. 142, § 133, eff. Oct. 1, 1978. Amended by Laws 1982, Ch. 238, § 6; Laws 1982, Ch. 276, § 2; Laws 1983, Ch. 271, § 3, eff. Jan. 1, 1984.]

 

Arkansas

 

"The following are among the factors to be considered in determining if the officer has grounds to "reasonably suspect": (1) The demeanor of the suspect; (2) The gait and manner of the suspect; (3) Any knowledge the officer may have of the suspect's background or character; (4) Whether the suspect is carrying anything, and what he is carrying; (5) The manner in which the suspect is dressed, including bulges in clothing, when considered in light of all of the other factors; (6) The time of the day or night the suspect is observed; 7) Any overheard conversation of the suspect; (8) The particular streets and areas involved; (9) Any information received from third persons, whether they are known or unknown; (10) Whether the suspect is consorting with others whose conduct is "reasonably suspect"; (11) The suspect's proximity to known criminal conduct; (12) Incidence of crime in the immediate neighborhood; (13) The suspect's apparent effort to conceal an article; (14) Apparent effort of the suspect to avoid identification or confrontation by the police." A.C.A. § 16-81-203.

"(a) A law enforcement officer lawfully present in any place may, in the performance of his duties, stop and detain any person whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a felony, if the action is reasonably necessary to identify or determine the lawfulness of such person's conduct. (b) An officer acting under this section may require that person to remain in or near the place in the officer's presence for a period of not more than fifteen (15) minutes, at the end of which period the person detained shall be released without further restraint, or arrested and charged with a crime. (c) As promptly as is reasonable under the circumstances, a law enforcement officer who has detained a person under this section shall advise that person of his official identity and inform the person of the reason for the detention." A.C.A. § 16-81-204. [derivation note: History. Acts 1969, No. 378, § 1, eff. Apr. 9, 1969; A.S.A. 1947, § 43-429]

"A law enforcement officer acting under the authority of § 16-81-204 may use such force as may be reasonably necessary under the circumstances to stop and detain any person for the purposes authorized by this subchapter." A.C.A. § 16-81-205.

"(a) A law enforcement officer who has detained a person under § 16-81-204 may, if he reasonably suspects that the person is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or others, search the outer clothing of the person and the immediate surroundings for, and seize, any weapon or other dangerous thing which may be used against the officer or others. (b) In no event shall that search be more detailed than is reasonably necessary to ensure the safety of the officer or others." A.C.A. § 16-81-206.

"Whenever a law enforcement officer has reasonable cause to believe that any person found at or near the scene of a felony is a material witness to the felony, he may stop that person and, after having identified himself, he must advise the person of the purpose of the stopping and may then demand of him his name, address, and any information he may have regarding the felony. The detention shall in all cases be reasonable and in no event shall the detention be in excess of fifteen (15) minutes." A.C.A. § 16-81-209.

 

California

 

"A peace officer may search for dangerous weapons any person whom he has legal cause to arrest, whenever he has reasonable cause to believe that the person possesses a dangerous weapon. If the officer finds a dangerous weapon, he may take and keep it until the completion of the questioning, when he shall either return it or arrest the person. The arrest may be for the illegal possession of the weapon." West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 833. [derivation note: Added by Stats.1957, c. 2147, p. 3807, § 9]

"(a) In addition to any other detention permitted by law, if a peace officer has reasonable cause to believe that a person has a firearm or other deadly weapon with him or her in violation of any provision of law relating to firearms or deadly weapons the peace officer may detain that person to determine whether a crime relating to firearms or deadly weapons has been committed. For purposes of this section "reasonable cause to detain" requires that the circumstances known or apparent to the officer must include specific and articulable facts causing him or her to suspect that some offense relating to firearms or deadly weapons has taken place or is occurring or is about to occur and that the person he or she intends to detain is involved in that offense. The circumstances must be such as would cause any reasonable peace officer in like position, drawing when appropriate on his or her training and experience, to suspect the same offense and the same involvement by the person in question. (b) Incident to any detention permitted pursuant to subdivision (a), a peace officer may conduct a limited search of the person for firearms or weapons if the peace officer reasonably concludes that the person detained may be armed and presently dangerous to the peace officer or others. Any firearm or weapon seized pursuant to a valid detention or search pursuant to this section shall be admissible in evidence in any proceeding for any purpose permitted by law. (c) This section shall not be construed to otherwise limit the authority of a peace officer to detain any person or to make an arrest based on reasonable cause. (d) This section shall not be construed to permit a peace officer to conduct a detention or search of any person at the person's residence or place of business absent a search warrant or other reasonable cause to detain or search. (e) If a firearm or weapon is seized pursuant to this section and the person from whom it was seized owned the firearm or weapon and is convicted of a violation of any offense relating to the possession of such firearm or weapon, the court shall order the firearm or weapon to be deemed a nuisance and disposed of in the manner provided by Section 12028." West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 833.5. [derivation note: Added by Stats. 1982, c. 142, p. 476, § 3]

 

Colorado

 

"(1) A peace officer may stop any person who he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime and may require him to give his name and address, identification if available, and an explanation of his actions. The stopping shall not constitute an arrest. (2) When a peace officer has stopped a person for questioning pursuant to this section and reasonably suspects that his personal safety requires it, he may conduct a pat-down search of that person for weapons." C.R.S.A. § 16-3-103. [derivation note: Repealed and reenacted Laws 1972, S.B.44, § 1. Laws 1983, H.B.1340, § 2]

 

Connecticut

 

"We are in accord with the proposition that, as a matter of common law, '(w)hen an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary meaures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.'" State v. Williams, 157 Conn. 114, 118, 249 A.2d 245, 247 (1968). [I can find no statutory "Terry stop" provision, only case law authorizing the stop.]

 

Delaware

 

"(a) A peace officer may stop any person abroad, or in a public place, who he has reasonable ground to suspect is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime, and may demand of him his name, address, business abroad and where he is going. (b) Any person so questioned who fails to identify himself or explain his actions to the satisfaction of the officer may be detained and further questioned and investigated. (c) The total period of detention provided for by this section shall not exceed 2 hours. The detention is not an arrest and shall not be recorded as an arrest in any official record. At the end of the detention the person so detained shall be released or be arrested and charged with a crime." 11 Del.C. § 1902.

"A peace officer may search for a dangerous weapon any person whom he has stopped or detained to question as provided in § 1902 of this title, whenever he has reasonable ground to believe that he is in danger if the person possesses a dangerous weapon. If the officer finds a weapon, he may take and keep it until the completion of the questioning, when he shall either return it or arrest the person. The arrest may be for the illegal possession of the weapon." 11 Del.C. § 1903.

"Wilson builds an argument upon the Uniform Arrest Act, 11 Del.C.Ann. § 1901 et seq., adopted in Delaware in 1951." Wilson v. State, 49 Del. 37, 53, 109 A.2d 381, 389 (1954).

 

District of Columbia

 

"It is well established, at least since the Supreme Court's decision in Terry, that the police may stop and briefly detain a person for further investigation without probable cause to arrest provided they have an articulable suspicion based on specific facts and reasonable inferences that the individual is engaged in criminal conduct." Holston v. U.S., 633 A.2d 378, 381 (D.C. App. 1993). [I can find no statutory "Terry stop" provision, only case law authorizing the stop.]

 

Florida

 

"(1) This section may be known and cited as the "Florida Stop and Frisk Law." (2) Whenever any law enforcement officer of this state encounters any person under circumstances which reasonably indicate that such person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a violation of the criminal laws of this state or the criminal ordinances of any municipality or county, he may temporarily detain such person for the purpose of ascertaining the identity of the person temporarily detained and the circumstances surrounding his presence abroad which led the officer to believe that he had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a criminal offense. (3) No person shall be temporarily detained under the provisions of subsection (2) longer than is reasonably necessary to effect the purposes of that subsection. Such temporary detention shall not extend beyond the place where it was first effected or the immediate vicinity thereof. (4) If at any time after the onset of the temporary detention authorized by subsection (2), probable cause for arrest of person shall appear, the person shall be arrested. If, after an inquiry into the circumstances which prompted the temporary detention, no probable cause for the arrest of the person shall appear, he shall be released. (5) Whenever any law enforcement officer authorized to detain temporarily any person under the provisions of subsection (2) has probable cause to believe that any person whom he has temporarily detained, or is about to detain temporarily, is armed with a dangerous weapon and therefore offers a threat to the safety of the officer or any other person, he may search such person so temporarily detained only to the extent necessary to disclose, and for the purpose of disclosing, the presence of such weapon. If such a search discloses such a weapon or any evidence of a criminal offense it may be seized. (6) No evidence seized by a law enforcement officer in any search under this section shall be admissible against any person in any court of this state or political subdivision thereof unless the search which disclosed its existence was authorized by and conducted in compliance with the provisions of subsections (2)-(5)." West's F.S.A. § 901.151. [derivation note: Laws 1969, c. 69-73, §§ 1, 2. "This act is effective October 1, 1969."]

 

Georgia

 

"To justify a brief "Terry" stop, an officer must have an articulable, reasonable suspicion that the law is being violated. The reasons justifying an investigatory stop need not rise to the level of probable cause, but must be more than a mere hunch and must not be arbitrary or harassing." Sams v. State, 457 S.E.2d 812, 813 (Ga. 1995). [I can find no statutory "Terry stop" provision, only case law authorizing the stop.]

 

Hawaii

 

"An enforcement officer may detain any person found upon a vessel under circumstances as reasonably justify a suspicion that the person boarded without permission for the purpose of demanding, and may demand of the person, the person's name, address, and the nature of the person's business upon the vessel. If the enforcement officer has reason to believe that the person has no right to be upon the vessel, the enforcement officer may arrest the person without a warrant on the charge of violating section 200-62." H.R.S. § 200-63. [derivation note: L. 1991, c 272, pt of § 2]

"A police officer may detain any person found upon an aircraft, under circumstances as reasonably justify a suspicion that the person boarded without permission, for the purpose of demanding, and may demand the name and address of the person and the nature of the person's business upon the aircraft. If the police officer has reason to believe that the person has no right to be upon the aircraft, the police officer may arrest the person without a warrant on the charge of violating section 261-91." H.R.S. § 261-92. [derivation note: L 1981, c 25, pt of § 1]

"Whenever a crime is committed, and the offenders are unknown, and any person is found near the place where the crime was committed, either endeavoring to conceal oneself, or endeavoring to escape, or under such other circumstances as to justify a reasonable suspicion of the person being the offender, the person may be arrested without warrant." H.R.S. § 803-4. [derivation note: PC 1869, c 49, § 4; RL 1925, § 3970; RL 1935, § 5403; RL 1945, § 10704; RL 1955, § 255-4; HRS § 708-4; ren L 1972, c 9, pt of § 1; am imp L 1984, c 90, § 1]

 

Idaho

 

"Not all seizures of the person need be justified by probable cause to arrest for a crime; a police officer may, in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, detain a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880. Such a seizure is justified under the Fourth Amendment if there is an articulable suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime. [citations omitted]" State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 932, 829 P.2d 520, 522 (1992). [I can find no statutory "Terry stop" provision, only case law authorizing the stop.]

 

Illinois

 

"Temporary Questioning without Arrest. A peace officer, after having identified himself as a peace officer, may stop any person in a public place for a reasonable period of time when the officer reasonably infers from the circumstances that the person is committing, is about to commit or has committed an offense as defined in Section 102-15 of this Code, and may demand the name and address of the person and an explanation of his actions. Such detention and temporary questioning will be conducted in the vicinity of where the person was stopped." 725 Il.C.S. 5/107-14. [derivation note: Laws 1963, p. 2836, § 107-14, added by Laws 1968, p. 218, § 1, eff. Aug. 21, 1968.]

"Search During Temporary Questioning. When a peace officer has stopped a person for temporary questioning pursuant to Section 107-14 of this Code and reasonably suspects that he or another is in danger of attack, he may search the person for weapons. If the officer discovers a weapon, he may take it until the completion of the questioning, at which time he shall either return the weapon, if lawfully possessed, or arrest the person so questioned." 725 Il.C.S. 5/108-1.01. [derivation note: Laws 1963, p. 2836, § 108-1.01, added by Laws 1968, p. 218, § 1, eff. Aug. 21, 1968.]

 

Indiana

 

"Whether a particular fact situation justifies an investigatory stop is determined on a case by case basis...The requirements of the Fourth Amendment are satisfied if the facts known to the officer at the moment of the stop are such that a person "of reasonable caution" would believe that the "action taken was appropriate."...Indiana has adopted this test. [citations omitted]" Baran v. State, 639 N.E.2d 642, 644 (Ind. 1994). [I can find no statutory "Terry stop" provision, only case law authorizing the stop.]

 

Iowa

 

"Our law is well settled that the police may stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has "reasonable cause to believe a crime may have occurred." [citations omitted]" State v. Rosenstiel, 473 N.W.2d 59, 61 (1991). [I can find no statutory "Terry stop" provision, only case law authorizing the stop.]

 

Kansas

 

"(1) Without making an arrest, a law enforcement officer may stop any person in a public place whom such officer reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime and may demand of the name, address of such suspect and an explanation of such suspect's actions. (2) When a law enforcement officer has stopped a person for questioning pursuant to this section and reasonably suspects that such officer's personal safety requires it, such officer may frisk such person for firearms or other dangerous weapons. If the law enforcement officer finds a firearm or weapon, or other thing, the possession of which may be a crime or evidence of crime, such officer may take and keep it until the completion of the questioning, at which time such officer shall either return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest such person." K.S.A. § 22-2402. [derivation note: History: L. 1970, ch. 129, § 22-2402, eff. July 1, 1970; L. 1990, ch. 106, § 1; July 1.]

 

Kentucky

 

"Where probable cause is lacking, the forceable encounter or stop of a citizen by a police officer must arise from a reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot." Docksteader v. Com., 802 S.W.2d 149, 150 (Ky. App. 1991). [I can find no statutory "Terry stop" provision, only case law authorizing the stop.]

 

Louisiana

 

"A. A law enforcement officer may stop a person in a public place whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed, or is about to commit an offense and may demand of him his name, address, and an explanation of his actions. B. When a law enforcement officer has stopped a person for questioning pursuant to this Article and reasonably suspects that he is in danger, he may frisk the outer clothing of such person for a dangerous weapon. If the law enforcement officer reasonably suspects the person possesses a dangerous weapon, he may search the person. C. If the law enforcement officer finds a dangerous weapon, he may take and keep it until the completion of the questioning, at which time he shall either return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest such person." L.S.A.-C.Cr.P. Art. 215.1. [derivation note: Added by Acts 1968, No. 305, § 1. Amended by Acts 1982, No. 686, § 1; Acts 1983, 1st Ex. Sess., No. 32, § 1.]

 

Maine

 

"Any person who a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe has committed or is committing a crime other than one listed under section 15, subsection 1, paragraph A, and to whom a law enforcement officer is authorized to deliver a summons pursuant to subsection 1, who intentionally fails or refuses to provide to that officer reasonably credible evidence of that person's name and address commits a Class E crime, provided that the person persists in the failure or refusal after having been informed by the officer of the provisions of this subsection. If that person furnishes the officer evidence of the person's name and address and the evidence does not appear to be reasonably credible, the officer shall attempt to verify the evidence as quickly as is reasonably possible. During the period the verification is being attempted, the officer may require the person to remain in the officer's presence for a period not to exceed 2 hours. During this period, if the officer reasonably believes that the officer's safety or the safety of others present requires, the officer may search for any dangerous weapon by an external patting of that person's outer clothing. If in the course of the search the officer feels an object that the officer reasonably believes to be a dangerous weapon, the officer may take such action as is necessary to examine the object, but may take permanent possession of the object only if it is subject to forfeiture. The requirement that the person remain in the presence of the officer does not constitute an arrest. After informing that person of the provisions of this subsection, the officer may arrest the person either if the person intentionally refuses to furnish any evidence of that person's name and address or if, after attempting to verify the evidence as provided for in this subsection, the officer has probable cause to believe that the person has intentionally failed to provide reasonably credible evidence of the person's name and address." 17-A M.R.S.A. § 15-A (2). [derivation note: 1987, c. 375; 1991, c. 459, § 4, eff. June 21, 1991.]

"Any peace officer or any person employed as watchman, guard or in a supervisory capacity on premises posted, as provided in section 1009, may stop any person found on any premises to which entry without permission is forbidden by section 1009 and may detain him for the purpose of questioning and may question him with respect to his name, address and business in that place. If the peace officer or employee has reason to believe from the answers of the person so interrogated that the person has no right to be in that place, the peace officer shall forthwith either release that person or arrest the person without a warrant on the charge of violating section 1009. The employee shall forthwith release the person or turn him over to a peace officer, who may arrest him without a warrant on the charge of violating section 1009." 37-B M.R.S.A. § 1010. [sabotage statutes] [derivation note: R.S.1954, c. 136, § 29. Laws 1971, c. 580, § 1. Laws 1983, c. 460, § 2. Former § 461 of title 25; § 171 of title 37-A.]

 

Maryland

 

"Any peace officer or any person employed as watchman, guard, or in a supervisory capacity on premises posted as provided in § 541 may stop any person found on any premises to which entry without permission is forbidden by § 541 and may detain him for the purpose of demanding, and may demand, of him his name, address and business in such place. If said peace officer or employee has reason to believe from the answers of the persons so interrogated that such person has no right to be in such place, said peace officer shall forthwith release such person or he may arrest such person without a warrant on the charge of violating the provisions of § 541; and said employee shall forthwith release such person or turn him over to a peace officer, who may arrest him without a warrant on the charge of violating the provisions of § 541." Md. Code 1957, Art. 27, § 542. [sabotage statutes] [derivation note: An. Code, 1951, § 618; 1941, ch. 388, § 576H.]

"As Graham notes, this Court has held that an individual "may be restrained in a police dominated atmosphere by physical force or a show of authority." Jones v. State, 319 Md. 279, 287, 572 A.2d 169 (1990) (emphasis added). Graham acknowledges that a detention short of an arrest is lawful if the police have a reasonable, articulable suspicion for such action." Graham v. State, 325 Md. 398, 404, 601 A.2d 131, 134 (1992).

 

Massachusetts

 

"...They may examine all persons abroad whom they have reason to suspect of unlawful design, and may demand of them their business abroad and whither they are going; may disperse any assembly of three or more persons, and may enter any building to suppress a riot or breach of peace therein. Persons so suspected who do not give a satisfactory account of themselves, persons so assembled and who do not disperse when ordered, and persons making, aiding and abetting in a riot or disturbance may be arrested by the police, and may thereafter be safely kept by imprisonment or otherwise unless released in the manner provided by law, and taken before a district court to be examined and prosecuted...If a police officer stops a person for questioning pursuant to this section and reasonably suspects that he is in danger of life or limb, he may search such person for a dangerous weapon. If he finds such weapon or any other thing the possession of which may constitute a crime, he may take and keep it until the completion of the questioning, at which time he shall return it, if lawfully possessed, or he shall arrest such person." M.G.L.A. 41 § 98. [derivation note: St.1851, c. 162. G.S.1860, c. 18, § 38. P.S.1882, c. 27, § 85. St.1893, c. 423, § 7. R.L.1902, c. 25, § 94. St.1920, c. 591, § 24. Amended by St.1953, c. 319, § 9; St.1954, c. 162, § 1; St.1957, c. 688, § 1; St.1967, c. 368, §§ 1, 2; St.1970, c. 181.] [Frisk part added in 1967]

 

Michigan

 

"Sec. 42. (1) The operator or person in charge of a snowmobile being used or operated in this state, who is by hand, voice, emergency light or siren, or a visual or audible signal, directed to bring his or her snowmobile to a stop by any peace, police, or conservation officer who is in uniform and empowered to enforce the provisions of this act or the provisions of a local ordinance or rules established under this act, shall immediately bring the snowmobile to a stop or maneuver it in a manner that permits the officer to come alongside. A vehicle or snowmobile which is used by an officer at night for purposes of enforcing this act shall be identified as an official law enforcement vehicle or snowmobile. The operator or person in charge of the snowmobile and any other person on board shall give his or her correct name and address, exhibit the certificate of registration awarded for the snowmobile, and submit to a reasonable inspection of the snowmobile and to a reasonable inspection and test of the equipment of the snowmobile. (2) A person who wilfully fails to obey the direction by increasing his or her speed, extinguishing his or her lights, or otherwise attempts to flee or elude the officer, is guilty of a misdemeanor. (3) A person who is detained for a violation of this act or of a local ordinance substantially corresponding to a provision of this act and who furnishes a peace officer false, forged, fictitious, or misleading verbal or written information identifying the person as another person is guilty of a misdemeanor. (4) A peace officer who observes a violation by a person of this act or of a local ordinance or rule established under this act may arrest the person without a warrant." M.C.L.A. 257.1542. [derivation note: P.A.1968, No. 74, § 42, added by P.A.1994, No. 98, § 1, Eff. May 1, 1994.]

"Sec. 161. (1) Upon the direction of a peace officer, the operator of a vessel moving on the waters of this state shall immediately bring the vessel to a stop or maneuver it in a manner that permits the peace officer to come beside the vessel. The operator of the vessel and any person on the vessel shall do the following upon the request of the peace officer: (a) Provide his or her correct name and address. (b) Exhibit the certificate of number awarded for the vessel. (c) If the vessel does not bear a decal described in subsection (3), submit to a reasonable inspection of the vessel and to a reasonable inspection and test of the equipment of the vessel...(7) Except for inspection of a vessel to determine the number and adequacy of personal flotation devices on that vessel, a peace officer shall not stop and inspect a vessel bearing the decal described in this section during the period the decal remains in effect unless that peace officer has probable cause to believe the vessel or the vessel's operator is in violation of a marine law." M.C.L.A. 281.1161. [derivation note: P.A.1967, No. 303, § 161, Eff. Jan. 1, 1968. C.L.1948, § 281.1161.]

"The police are authorized to stop an individual where there is a reasonable suspicion that crime has been or is taking place." People v. Grimmett, 97 Mich.App. 212, 215, 293 N.W.2d 768, 770 (1980).

 

Minnesota

 

"To come within the exception, the search or seizure must be founded upon some objective justification. That justification can be a "reasonable suspicion" entertained by a police officer based upon the officer's experience that criminal activity may be taking place and that the individual with whom the officer is confronted may be armed and capable of immediately causing permanent harm. Obviously, whether that "reasonable suspicion" justifies the limited search is fact determinative." Wold v. State, 430 N.W.2d 171, 174 (1988).

 

Mississippi

 

"A law enforcement officer may stop any child abroad in a public place whom the officer has probable cause to believe is within the jurisdiction of the youth court and may question the child as to his name, address and explanation of his actions." Mississippi Code 1972, § 43-21-305. [derivation note: Laws, 1979, ch. 506, § 34, eff from and after July 1, 1979.]

"In order for an officer to have legal authority for an investigative stop, he need not have probable cause to make an arrest. He need only have a reasonable suspicion that the accused is involved in a felony." Haddox v. State, 636 So.2d 1229, 1233 (Miss. 1994).

 

Missouri

 

"...They shall also have the power to stop any person abroad whenever there is reasonable ground to suspect that he is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime and demand of him his name, address, business abroad and whither he is going. When stopping or detaining a suspect, they may search him for a dangerous weapon whenever they have reasonable ground to believe they are in danger from the possession of such dangerous weapon by the suspect. No unreasonable force shall be used in detaining or arresting any person, but such force as may be necessary may be used when there is no other apparent means of making an arrest or preventing an escape and only after the peace officer has made every reasonable effort to advise the person that he is the peace officer engaged in making arrest..." V.A.M.S. 84.710. [derivation note: L. 1943, p. 727, § 7673.]

 

Montana

 

"In order to obtain or verify an account of the person's presence or conduct or to determine whether to arrest the person, a peace officer may stop any person or vehicle that is observed in circumstances that create a particularized suspicion that the person or occupant of the vehicle has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense." M.C.A. 46-5-401. [derivation note: En. 95-719 by Sec. 4, Ch. 513, L. 1973; amd. Sec. 8, Ch. 184, L. 1977; R.C.M. 1947, 95-719(1) thru (3); amd. Sec. 42, Ch. 800, L. 1991.]

"A peace officer who has lawfully stopped a person under 46-5-401 or this section: (1) may frisk the person and take other reasonably necessary steps for protection if the officer has reasonable cause to suspect that the person is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or another person present; (2) may take possession of any object that is discovered during the course of the frisk if the officer has probable cause to believe the object is a deadly weapon; (3) may demand the name and present address of the person; and (4) shall inform the person, as promptly as possible under the circumstances and in any case before questioning the person, that the officer is a peace officer, that the stop is not an arrest but rather a temporary detention for an investigation, and that upon completion of the investigation, the person will be released if not arrested." M.C.A. 46-5-402. [derivation note: En. 95-719 by Sec. 4, Ch. 513, L. 1973; amd. Sec. 8, Ch. 184, L. 1977; R.C.M. 1947, 95-719(4) thru (7); amd. Sec. 43, Ch. 800, L. 1991.]

"A stop authorized by 46-5-401 or 46-6-411 may not last longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." M.C.A. 46-5-403.

 

Nebraska

 

"A peace officer may stop any person in a public place whom he reasonably suspects of committing, who has committed, or who is about to commit a crime and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his actions. When a peace officer has stopped a person for questioning pursuant to this section and reasonably suspects he is in danger of life or limb, he may search such person for a dangerous weapon. If the peace officer finds such a weapon or any other thing the possession of which may constitute a crime, he may take and keep it until the completion of questioning, at which time he shall either return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest such person. For purposes of this section, peace officer shall include credentialed conservation officers of the Game and Parks Commission." Neb.Rev.St. § 29-829. [derivation note: Laws 1965, c. 132, § 1, p. 471.]

 

Nevada

 

"1. Any peace officer may detain any person whom the officer encounters under circumstances which reasonably indicate that the person has committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime. 2. The officer may detain the person only to ascertain his identity and the suspicious circumstances surrounding his presence abroad. Any person so detained shall identify himself, but may not be compelled to answer any other inquiry of any peace officer. 3. No person may be detained longer than is reasonably necessary to effect the purposes of this section, and in no event longer than 60 minutes. The detention may not extend beyond the place or the immediate vicinity of the place where the detention was first effected, unless the person is arrested." N.R.S. 171.123. [derivation note: Added to NRS by 1969, 535; A 1973, 597; 1975, 1200; 1987, 1172]

"1. If any peace officer reasonably believes that any person whom he has detained or is about to detain pursuant to NRS 171.123 is armed with a dangerous weapon and is a threat to the safety of the peace officer or another, the peace officer may search such person to the extent reasonably necessary to ascertain the presence of such weapon. If the search discloses a weapon or any evidence of a crime, such weapon or evidence may be seized. 2. Nothing seized by a peace officer in any such search is admissible in any proceeding unless the search which disclosed the existence of such evidence is authorized by and conducted in compliance with this section." N.R.S. 171.1232. [derivation note: Added to NRS by 1969, 535]

 

New Hampshire

 

"A peace officer may stop any person abroad whom he has reason to suspect is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime, and may demand of him his name, address, business abroad and where he is going." R.S.A. § 594:2. [derivation note: 1941, 163:2. RL 423:21. RSA 594:2. 1985, 255:2, eff. Jan. 1, 1986.] [earlier version of statute held unconstitutional as far as it allowed custodial interrogation w/o probable cause, State v. White, 119 N.H. 567, 406 A.2d 291 (1979)]

"A peace officer may search for a dangerous weapon any person whom he is questioning or about to question as provided in RSA 594:2 whenever he reasonably believes that he might be in danger if such person possessed a dangerous weapon. If the officer finds a weapon, he may take and keep it until the completion of the questioning, when he shall either return it or arrest the person." R.S.A. § 594:3. [derivation note: Source. 1941, 163:3. RL 423:22.]

"Any peace officer or any person employed as watchman, guard, or in a supervisory capacity on premises posted as provided in RSA 649:7 may stop any person found on any premises to which entry without permission is forbidden by said section and may detain him for the purpose of demanding, and may demand, of him his name, address and business in such place. If said peace officer or employee has reason to believe from the answers of the person so interrogated that such person has no right to be in such place, said peace officer shall forthwith release such person or he may arrest such person without a warrant on the charge of violating the provisions of RSA 649:7; and said employee shall forthwith release such person or turn him over to a peace officer, who may arrest him without a warrant on the charge of violating the provisions of said section." R.S.A. § 649:8. [derivation note: Source. 1971, 518:1, eff. Nov. 1, 1973.]

 

New Jersey

 

"In the landmark decision of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), to which our courts adhere, the Supreme Court emphasized that a police officer has not only the right but also the obligation to question suspicious people on the street when it would be "poor police work" not to investigate further." State v. Tucker, 136 N.J. 158, 167-168, 642 A.2d 401, 406 (1994).

 

New Mexico

 

"Any peace officer or person employed as a watchman, guard or in a supervisory capacity on premises utilized in the manufacture, transportation or storage of any product in the preparation of the United States or of any of the states for defense or for war, or the manufacture, transportation, distribution or storage of gas, oil, coal, electricity or water or of any public utility, may stop any person found on such premises to which entry without permission is forbidden and where such premises are clearly posted with signs prohibiting entry, and may detain such person for the purpose of demanding the name, address and the individual's business in such place. If such peace officer or employee has reason to believe from the answers or conduct of the person so interrogated that the person detained has no right to be in such destricted [restricted] area, he shall forthwith either release such person, or may arrest the individual without a warrant on the charge of committing the crime of criminal trespass. In the event such peace officer or employee shall arrest such person found in the restricted area he shall forthwith turn the individual over to a peace officer who may arrest the individual without a warrant on the charge of committing criminal trespass." N.M.S.A. 1978, § 30-21-3. [derivation note: History: 1953 Comp., § 40A-21-3, enacted by Laws 1963, ch. 303, § 21-3.]

"An officer who makes a valid investigatory stop may briefly detain those he suspects of criminal activity to verify or quell that suspicion...The scope of activities during an investigatory detention must be reasonably related to the circumstances that initially justified the stop." State v. Werner, 117 N.M. 315, 317, 871 P.2d 971, 973 (1994).

 

New York

 

"1. In addition to the authority provided by this article for making an arrest without a warrant, a police officer may stop a person in a public place located within the geographical area of such officer's employment when he reasonably suspects that such person is committing, has committed or is about to commit either (a) a felony or (b) a misdemeanor defined in the penal law, and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his conduct. 2. Any person who is a peace officer and who provides security services for any court of the unified court system may stop a person in or about the courthouse to which he is assigned when he reasonably suspects that such person is committing, has committed or is about to commit either (a) a felony or (b) a misdemeanor defined in the penal law, and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his conduct. 3. When upon stopping a person under circumstances prescribed in subdivisions one and two a police officer or court officer, as the case may be, reasonably suspects that he is in danger of physical injury, he may search such person for a deadly weapon or any instrument, article or substance readily capable of causing serious physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding persons. If he finds such a weapon or instrument, or any other property possession of which he reasonably believes may constitute the commission of a crime, he may take it and keep it until the completion of the questioning, at which time he shall either return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest such person." McKinney's C.P.L. § 140.50. [derivation note: L.1970, c. 996, § 1; amended L.1972, c. 911, § 1; L.1973, c. 159, § 1; L.1973, c. 714, § 1; L.1985, c. 237, § 1.]

[Plain touch doctrine rejected, albeit before Minnesota v. Dickerson was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. However, N.Y. rests its decision on "adequate and independent" state grounds.]

"The conclusions that the drugs seized from defendant should have been suppressed and that there is no "plain touch" exception to the warrant requirement rest on our analysis of applicable Federal authority...We reach the same conclusions independently by analysis and application of our own State law based on New York authorities supplemented by decisions of other States...Our decision to reverse, therefore, while based on our analysis of Federal law, rests equally on an independently adequate State ground." [citations omitted] [Footnote 4] People v. Diaz, 81 N.Y.2d 106, 112, 612 N.E.2d 298, 302, 595 N.Y.S.2d 940, 944 (N.Y. 1993).

 

North Carolina

 

"Of course, North Carolina has no 'stop and frisk' statute although many states do...The lack of such statute, however, is not fatal to the authority of law enforcement officers in North Carolina to stop suspicious persons for questioning (field interrogation) and to search those persons for dangerous weapons (frisking)." State v. Streeter, 283 N.C. 203, 209, 195 S.E.2d 502, 506 (1973).

 

North Dakota

 

"A peace officer may stop any person abroad in a public place whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed, or is about to commit: 1. Any felony. 2. A misdemeanor relating to the possession of a concealed or dangerous weapon or weapons. 3. Burglary or unlawful entry. 4. A violation of any provision relating to possession of marijuana or of narcotic, hallucinogenic, depressant, or stimulant drugs. The peace officer may demand of such person his name, address, and an explanation of his actions. When a peace officer has stopped a person for questioning pursuant to this section and reasonably suspects that he is in danger of life or limb, he may search such person for a dangerous weapon. If the peace officer finds such a weapon or any other thing, the possession of which may constitute a crime, he may take and keep it until the completion of the questioning, at which time he shall either return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest such person." N.D.C.C., 29-29-21. [derivation note: Source: S.L. 1969, ch. 302, § 1; 1971, ch. 319, § 1.]

 

Ohio

 

"In order to warrant a brief investigatory stop, the police officer "must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Terry v. Ohio (1967), 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906. Such a stop must be viewed in light of the totality of the surrounding circumstances presented to the police officer. State v. Freeman (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 291, 18 O.O.3d 472, 414 N.E.2d 1044." State v. Loza, 71 Ohio St.3d 61, 71, 641 N.E.2d 1082, 1097 (1994).

 

Oklahoma

 

"Any peace officer or any person employed as watchman, guard, or in a supervisory capacity on premises posted as provided in Section 7 may stop any person found on any premises to which entry without permission is forbidden by Section 7 and may detain him for the purpose of demanding, and may demand of him his name, address and business in such place. If said peace officer or employee has reason to believe from the answers of the person so interrogated that such person has no right to be in such place, said peace officer shall forthwith release such person or he may arrest such person without a warrant on the charge of violating the provisions of Section 7; and said employee shall forthwith release such person or turn him over to a peace officer, who may arrest him without a warrant on the charge of violating the provisions of Section 7." 21 Okl.St.Ann. § 1265.8. [sabotage statute] [derivation note: Laws 1941, p. 86, § 8.]

"If an officer is momentarily detaining a person in order to make inquiry so as to determine his identity and obtain more information, and is in no way attempting to restrain him of his liberty or take him into custody, then the stop does not constitute an arrest, but rather is an investigatory detention." Ross v. State, 829 P.2d 58, 62 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992).

 

Oregon

 

"(1) A peace officer who reasonably suspects that a person has committed a crime may stop the person and, after informing the person that the peace officer is a peace officer, make a reasonable inquiry. (2) The detention and inquiry shall be conducted in the vicinity of the stop and for no longer than a reasonable time. (3) The inquiry shall be considered reasonable only if limited to the immediate circumstances that aroused the officer's suspicion." O.R.S. § 131.615. [derivation note: 1973 c.836 § 31]

"(1) A peace officer may frisk a stopped person for dangerous or deadly weapons if the officer reasonably suspects that the person is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or other person present. (2) If, in the course of the frisk, the peace officer feels an object which the peace officer reasonably suspects is a dangerous or deadly weapon, the peace officer may take such action as is reasonably necessary to take possession of the weapon." O.R.S. § 131.625. [derivation note: 1973 c.836 § 32]

 

 

Pennsylvania

 

"In this Commonwealth, an investigatory stop of a vehicle is valid if the stop is based upon objective facts creating a reasonable suspicion that the detained motorist is engaged in unlawful activity." Com. v. McCandless, 538 Pa. 286, 291, 648 A.2d 309, 312 (1994).

 

Rhode Island

 

"A peace officer may detain any person abroad whom he or she has reason to suspect is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime, and may demand of the person his or her name, address, business abroad, and destination; and any such person who fails to identify himself or herself and explain his or her actions to the satisfaction of the peace officer may be further detained and further questioned and investigated by any peace officer; provided, in no case shall the total period of such detention exceed two (2) hours, and the detention shall not be recorded as an arrest in any official record. At the end of the detention period the person so detained shall be released unless arrested and charged with a crime." R.I. Gen.Laws 1956, § 12-7-1. [derivation note: G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 68; P.L. 1941, ch. 982, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-7-1.]

"12-7-18 Temporary detention powers of national guardsmen. [same text as § 12-7-1 above substituting "national guard member of the rank of sergeant or higher who is on emergency state duty pursuant to the call of the governor" for "peace officer"]." R.I. Gen.Laws 1956, § 12-7-18. [derivation note: P.L. 1973, ch. 120, § 1.]

"A peace officer may search for a dangerous weapon any person he or she is questioning or about to question concerning any crime or suspected crime, whenever the officer reasonably believes that he or she is in danger from the person carrying such weapon, and if such person is carrying a dangerous weapon, an officer may take and keep it until the completion of questioning, when he or she shall either return it or arrest the person." R.I. Gen.Laws 1956, § 12-7-2. [derivation note: G.L. 1938, ch. 625, § 68; P.L. 1941, ch. 982, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 12-7-2.]

 

South Carolina

 

"In South Carolina, we have gone a little further by holding that an officer may stop a car and briefly detain the occupants if he has a reasonable suspicion that the occupants are involved in criminal activity." Sikes v. State, 448 S.E.2d 560, 562 (S.C. 1994).

 

South Dakota

 

"A police officer may not stop a vehicle without a reasonable basis for doing so; the officer must have a specific and articulable suspicion of a violation before a vehicle stop will be justified." State v. Claussen, 522 N.W.2d 196, 198 (S.D. 1994).

 

Tennessee

 

"A police officer may make an investigatory stop of a motor vehicle when the officer has a reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that a criminal offense has been or is about to be committed." State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tenn. 1992).

 

Texas

 

"When an officer has a reasonable suspicion that some unusual activity with which the detainee is connected is occurring or has occurred, and that activity may be related to a crime, a temporary detention is justified. TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 14.03(a)(1) (Vernon Supp.1993)" Cofield v. State, 857 S.W.2d 798, 802 (Tex. App. 1993), aff'd, 891 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. Cr. App. 1994).

"(a) Any peace officer may arrest, without warrant: 1) persons found in suspicious places and under circumstances which reasonably show that such persons have been guilty of some felony, violation of Title 9, Chapter 42, Penal Code, breach of the peace, or offense under Section 49.02, Penal Code, or threaten, or are about to commit some offense against the laws..." Vernon's Ann.Texas C.C.P. Art. 14.03 (a) (1). [derivation note: Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722. Amended by Acts 1967, 60th Leg., p. 1735, ch. 659, § 9, eff. Aug. 28, 1967.]

 

Utah

 

"A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his name, address and an explanation of his actions." U.C.A. 1953 § 77-7-15. [derivation note: History: C. 1953, 77-7-15, enacted by L. 1980, ch. 15, § 2]

"A peace officer who has stopped a person temporarily for questioning may frisk the person for a dangerous weapon if he reasonably believes he or any other person is in danger." U.C.A. 1953 § 77-7-16.

 

Vermont

 

"Any peace officer or any person employed as watchman, guard, or in a supervisory capacity on premises posted as provided in section 3437 of this title may stop any person found on any premises to which entry without permission is forbidden by section 3437 and may detain him for the purpose of requiring of him his name, address and business in such place. If such peace officer or employee has reason to believe from the answers of the person so interrogated that such person has no right to be in such place, he shall forthwith arrest such person without a warrant on the charge of violating the provisions of section 3437." 13 V.S.A. § 3439. [derivation note: Source. V.S. 1947, § 7237. 1947, No. 202, § 7332. 1941, No. 188, § 8.]

"A person, while operating or in charge of a motor vehicle shall, upon request by an enforcement officer who reasonably suspects that the person has committed or is committing a violation of this title, give his or her name and address and the name and address of the owner of the motor vehicle and produce his or her operator's license and the registration certificate for the motor vehicle. If the operator does not have a valid Vermont operator's license the operator shall produce other suitable forms of identification. A person operating a motor vehicle shall promptly and carefully stop when signalled to stop by an enforcement officer wearing insignia which identifies the officer." 23 V.S.A. § 1012 (a). [derivation note: Added 1971, No. 258 (Adj. Sess.), § 3, eff. March 1, 1973.]

 

Virginia

 

"A. A correctional officer, as defined in § 53.1-1, who has completed the minimum training standards established by the Department of Criminal Justice Services, or other noncustodial employee of the Department of Corrections who has been designated to carry a weapon by the Director of the Department of Corrections pursuant to § 53.1-29 of the Code and who has completed the basic course in detention training as approved by the Department of Criminal Justice Services, may, while on duty in or on the grounds of a correctional institution, or with custody of prisoners without the confines of a correctional institution, detain any person whom he has reasonable suspicion to believe has committed a violation of §§ 18.2-473 through 18.2-475, or of aiding or abetting a prisoner in violating the provisions of § 53.1-203. Such detention shall be for the purpose of summoning a law-enforcement officer in order that the law-enforcement officer can arrest the person who is alleged to have violated any of the above sections." Virginia Code 1950, § 19.2-81.2 (A). [Correctional Inst. Statute] [derivation note: 1976, c. 740; 1979, c. 642; 1984, cc. 720, 779.)]

"As pertinent here, a person may be detained briefly for questioning by an officer who has " 'a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity.' " Leeth, 223 Va. at 340, 288 S.E. 2d at 478, quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2641, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979)." Zimmerman v. Com., 234 Va. 609, 611, 363 S.E.2d 708, 709 (1988).

 

Washington

 

"A person who is to receive a notice of civil infraction under RCW 7.80.050 is required to identify himself or herself to the enforcement officer by giving his or her name, address, and date of birth. Upon the request of the officer, the person shall produce reasonable identification, including a driver's license or identicard. A person who is unable or unwilling to reasonably identify himself or herself to an enforcement officer may be detained for a period of time not longer than is reasonably necessary to identify the person for purposes of issuing a civil infraction. Each agency authorized to issue civil infractions shall adopt rules on identification and detention of persons committing civil infractions." West's R.C.W.A. 7.80.060. [derivation note: Enacted by Laws 1987, ch. 456, § 14, eff. Jan. 1, 1989.]

"It is unlawful for any person while operating or in charge of any vehicle to refuse when requested by a police officer to give his name and address and the name and address of the owner of such vehicle, or for such person to give a false name and address, and it is likewise unlawful for any such person to refuse or neglect to stop when signaled to stop by any police officer or to refuse upon demand of such police officer to produce his certificate of license registration of such vehicle, his insurance identification card, or his vehicle driver's license or to refuse to permit such officer to take any such license, card, or certificate for the purpose of examination thereof or to refuse to permit the examination of any equipment of such vehicle or the weighing of such vehicle or to refuse or neglect to produce the certificate of license registration of such vehicle, insurance card, or his vehicle driver's license when requested by any court. Any police officer shall on request produce evidence of his authorization as such." West's R.C.W.A. 46.61.020. [derivation note: Formerly § 46.56.190, enacted by Laws 1961, ch. 12, § 46.56.190, eff. Feb. 8, 1961. Recodified as § 46.61.020 and amended by Laws 1967, ch. 32, § 65, eff. March 15, 1967.] [AMENDED, check on it]

 

West Virginia

 

"Thus, police officers may stop a vehicle to investigate if they have an articulable reasonable suspicion that the vehicle is subject to seizure or a person in the vehicle "has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime[.]" [citations omitted]" State v. Stuart, 192 W.Va. 428, --, 452 S.E.2d 886, 889 (1994).

 

Wisconsin

 

"After having identified himself or herself as a law enforcement officer, a law enforcement officer may stop a person in a public place for a reasonable period of time when the officer reasonably suspects that such person is committing, is about to commit or has committed a crime, and may demand the name and address of the person and an explanation of the person's conduct. Such detention and temporary questioning shall be conducted in the vicinity where the person was stopped." W.S.A. 968.24. [derivation note: L.1969, c. 255, § 63, eff. July 1, 1970.]

When a law enforcement officer has stopped a person for temporary questioning pursuant to s. 968.24 and reasonably suspects that he or she or another is in danger of physical injury, the law enforcement officer may search such person for weapons or any instrument or article or substance readily capable of causing physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law abiding persons. If the law enforcement officer finds such a weapon or instrument, or any other property possession of which the law enforcement officer reasonably believes may constitute the commission of a crime, or which may constitute a threat to his or her safety, the law enforcement officer may take it and keep it until the completion of the questioning, at which time the law enforcement officer shall either return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest the person so questioned." W.S.A. 968.25. [derivation note: L.1969, c. 255, § 63, eff. July 1, 1970.]

"After having identified himself or herself as an enforcing officer, an enforcing officer may stop a person in a public place for a reasonable period of time when the officer reasonably suspects that such person is committing, is about to commit or has committed a violation of those statutes enumerated in s. 23.50(1), any administrative rules promulgated thereunder, any rule of the Kickapoo valley governing board under s. 16.21(7)(k), or any local ordinances enacted by any local authority in accordance with s. 23.33(11)(am) or 30.77. Such a stop may be made only where the enforcing officer has proper authority to make an arrest for such a violation. The officer may demand the name and address of the person and an explanation of the person's conduct. Such detention and temporary questioning shall be conducted in the vicinity where the person was stopped." W.S.A. 23.58. [conservation statute] [derivation note: L.1975, c. 365, § 4, eff. May 29, 1976.]

"When an enforcing officer has stopped a person for temporary questioning pursuant to s. 23.58 and reasonably suspects that he or she or another is in danger of physical injury, the officer may search such person for weapons or any instrument or article or substance readily capable of causing physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law abiding persons. If the officer finds such a weapon or instrument, or any other property possession of which he or she reasonably believes may constitute the commission of a violation of those statutes enumerated in s. 23.50(1) or which may constitute a threat to his or her safety, the officer may take it and keep it until the completion of the questioning, at which time he or she shall either return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest the person so questioned for possession of the weapon, instrument, article or substance, if he or she has the authority to do so, or detain the person until a proper arrest can be made by appropriate authorities. Searches during temporary questioning as provided under this section shall only be conducted by those enforcing officers who have the authority to make arrests for crimes." W.S.A. 23.59. [conservation statute] [derivation note: L.1975, c. 365, § 4, eff. May 29, 1976.]

 

Wyoming

 

"The investigatory stop represents a seizure which invokes Fourth Amendment safeguards, but, by its less intrusive character, requires only the presence of specific and articulable facts and rational inferences which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or may be committing a crime." Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 219 (Wyo. 1994).

 

 

Minnesota v. Dickerson, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2130 (1993). ["Plain Feel" doctrine as extension of "Terry Stop"]

 

 
© 2007 Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright