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  Johnson's article discusses the problematic use of racial imagery in criminal cases.  Johnson acknowledges that the use of racial imagery is a topic that many individuals choose to ignore.  Some feel that perhaps use of racial imagery is rare, others use selective indifference to ignore the problem, and finally some people ignore the use of racial imagery because it would force them to examine their own behavior.  In order to address the problem, Johnson describes how racial imagery can be presented to a jury, what kind of stereotypes are used, and ways to address the problem.
       Johnson begins by describing the many occasions that racial imagery may be injected into a criminal trial.  First, racial images are portrayed to the public even before the trial begins during pretrial publicity.  The media often focuses on crimes against whites by people of color, and judges the accused as guilty before the trial begins.  Racial stereotyping can also occur during voir dire and opening statements.  During testimony, the prosecutor's questions can stress race, and witnesses may also use racial imagery.  While the opposing counsel may object to these occurrences, the testimony is still presented to the jury.  Finally, the use of racial imagery may also occur during closing arguments, jury instructions, and jury deliberations.  Thus, all of these examples show that racial imagery can occur at any time.
      Johnson next explores the reoccurring types of racial stereotyping, using recent cases as examples.  She first mentions that black may be identified with evil and white with good.  Also, some prosecutors create an image that African Americans are more violent and more involved in criminal activities than whites.  Another practice includes portraying African-American individuals as animal-like or subhuman.  Johnson uses shocking examples for each of the categories, and here mentions the case of Rodney King in which the officer stated King groaned like a wounded animal in addition to other racial comments.  Prosecutors also present to the jury the supposed sexual threat posed by black men, the stereotype of black dishonesty, us-them imagery, and mention race at irrelevant times.  Johnson also explores the use of subtle racial imagery that effects the jury.  While not attempting to discuss every stereotype that exists, Johnson's presentation does demonstrate the offensive use of racial imagery in criminal trials.
      Johnson next discusses the present regulations that exist to prevent racial bias in criminal cases.  The effect of racial imagery on the jury, especially subtle racial imagery, is hard to measure.  Johnson suggests that courts should determine if the racial imagery used at the trial as a whole deprived the defendant of due process.  In declaring a mistrial or a reversal, different courts use various standards to determine what types of racial imagery is prohibited.  Johnson finds that the available legal remedies are inadequate.  A change of venue often does not eliminate racial prejudice, and the voir dire often does not uncover a potential juror's true feeling regarding race.  Although Johnson finds that most irrelevant question concerning race and sexual relationships are reversed on appeal, other types of irrelevant questions concerning race usually do not result in a reversal.  Furthermore, some courts refuse reversal by stating the defense counsel sanctioned the imagery, that the errors were harmless, or the court minimizes the remark or finds it to be proper.  Not only are legal remedies inadequate, but the professional ethics of attorneys do not contain a provision forbidding the use of racial imagery and stereotypes.  Johnson states that these supposed protections are woefully inadequate.
      Johnson suggests as a first step that an ethical provision should be created to bar the use of racial imagery in criminal and civil cases.  Johnson also discusses the adoption of a racial imagery shield law much like the rape shield laws that are now in place.  However, due to the problems of the current rape shield laws, drafting such a provision may be difficult.  Johnson still provides her suggestions for establishing such a statute.  Finally, Johnson suggests the mandatory inclusion of minority jurors as another means to eliminate racial bias.

Article Summary by: Corrie Noir
Wake Forest University School of Law 1999

Article Summary by: Corrie Noir
Wake Forest University School of Law 1999