Student Review:

In this article, Chief Judge Newman urges appellate courts to genuinely apply the reasonable doubt standard in reviewing evidence in criminal appeals.  Newman feels that a lax application of the reasonable doubt standard has both convicted individuals who are not guilty and also acquitted individuals who are guilty.  Newman recommends that appellate courts should enforce a stronger application of the reasonable doubt standard.
      In the American court system, criminal conviction of a defendant requires that the jury find the individual guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The court system had to determine whether the reasonable doubt standard was a verbal formulation or a rule of law. Although at first the judicial role in the reasonable doubt standard was limited, by the 1970s most courts established that the judge needed to make a finding of sufficiency for reasonable doubt. Developing the reasonable doubt standard into a rule of law required that judges analyze the evidence to determine if it was legally sufficient for a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Also during the 1970s, the Supreme Court decided that the reasonable doubt standard was a constitutional requirement in criminal cases.  Due process required that the court use the reasonable doubt standard to assess the sufficiency of the evidence presented.  However, the court named two tests for the sufficiency of evidence- whether the reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and whether any rational trier could find reasonable doubt.  Newman states that these two standards are vastly different and the any rational trier standard is less stringent than the reasonable jury standard.  However, most courts adopted the any rational trier standard.
      Newman notes that currently few appellate courts overturn verdicts for insufficiency of evidence regarding reasonable doubt.  Newman urges that courts should make the reasonable doubt standard an enforceable rule of law.  He first suggests that the reasonable doubt instruction should be made clearer to jurors.  Newman recommends adopting a model charge which states, Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant's guilt.  Also, Newman urges that the constitutional standard for sufficiency should not be the any rational trier standard, but the more demanding reasonable juror standard.  Additionally, appellate courts should critically assess the record to determine if the evidence is sufficient to meet the reasonable doubt standard.  Rather than ending their inquiry at the finding of some evidence of guilt, courts need to conscientiously assess whether the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
     Newman also suggests that appellate courts should be able to weigh the credibility of witnesses.  If courts find that a witness is questionable (i.e. if the witness has lied under oath and could benefit from his testimony) and the evidence is slight, courts should be able to determine that a reasonable jury could not find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Finally, courts should especially use a heightened sense of scrutiny in special categories of cases where the risk of convicting the innocent is higher than normal.  In cases which depend on eyewitness testimony or the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, the court should carefully determine if a jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
      Newman determines that a higher standard for reasonable doubt would not only prevent unjust convictions but would prevent unwarranted acquittals.  He notes that trial judges are often hesitant to allow evidence to be introduced that would be prejudicial.  In Newman's opinion, if trial courts were assured that the sufficiency of the evidence would be closely scrutinized on appeal, more evidence would be permitted into cases.  Thus, a strengthened standard of reasonable doubt would benefit everyone.

Article Summary by: Corrie Noir
Wake Forest University School of Law 1999