Student Review:

     In this article, Dix explores the area of nonarrest investigatory detentions (or field stops) of suspects.  Although the Supreme Court has declared the validity of such stops, many topics remain unclear in practice.  Thus, states should feel free to fill the gaps left by Supreme Court decisions and perhaps provide clearer standards for field stops under state laws.
     Dix defines nonarrest investigatory detentions as those detainments that give police officers the opportunity to obtain further information from the individual.  Terry v. Ohio established that the Fourth Amendment does not prevent individuals from being detained without arrest.  Rather than meeting the Fourth Amendment requirement of probable cause that governs arrests, field stops do not rise to the same level because they are significantly less intrusive.  Terry held that a detention in order to complete a weapons search did not have to rise to the level of probable cause.  However, Dix finds that the Supreme Court failed address the issues of when an investigatory detention occurs, how to distinguish an investigatory seizure, and the validity of nonarrest detentions for other conditions than weapons searches.  Further cases have determined that field stops are valid for investigatory purposes.  However, the Supreme Court's decisions have been silent on a number of issue.  These open issues can be clarified by enacting state law.
     Two models exist for states to pattern their nonarrest detention law.  The Uniform Arrest Act and the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure provide examples that states have adopted to form their own statutes.  However, Dix finds that even though state courts have no obligation to construe investigatory detention requirements the same as the Supreme Court, most states are hesitant to modify state law.  Dix discusses areas in which issues regarding search and seizures have not been resolved.
     First, it is unclear from case law when a stop rises to the level of a detention.  United States v. Mendenhall purported to create a clear standard by stating that an individual is seized if he believes he is not free to leave.  However, cases that follow Mendenhall do not consistently apply this standard.  Dix cites INS v. Delgdo in which although factory workers were blocked by agents from leaving the factory, the Court held that no seizure occurred.  Secondly, while nonarrest investigatory detentions must be based on reasonable suspicion, it is mainly undetermined whether such suspicion should only apply to a certain type of offense (such as a felony or possession of a concealed weapon).  While some states do clarify the type of offense required, other states are silent.  Dix advises that narrowing investigatory detentions to exclude minor crimes reduces the unreasonableness of the search and prevents abuse.
     Another question lies in the timing of the nonarrest detention.  The Supreme Court acknowledges that officers have the right to search an individual if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the individual is in the process of committing a crime.  However, since Dix recognizes that the beneficial aspect to investigatory stops is to prevent future crimes, he asks when can field stops be used before a suspect commits a crime?  Usually the standard is whether the individual is about to commit a crime, but often courts do not give officer clear guidelines for preventative stops.  A fourth issue raised in regard to nonarrest investigatory detentions is what length is appropriate for the detentions.  The Supreme Court has resisted setting a clear guideline, and many states likewise do not impose a clear time limit.  Dix states that without specific standards, courts and police officers are unclear as to what constitutes a reasonable time for detention.
 Dix's fifth concern is that only a minority of states discuss the regulations on police from moving a suspect during investigatory detentions.  Furthermore, only several states require the police to issue admonishments to the suspect.  Admonishments would require the officer to inform the individual the reason for and the expected duration of her detention.  Finally, it is unclear what amount of force the police are able to use for nonarrest investigatory detentions.  Some state statutes have requirements that prohibit the use of deadly force.  Dix suggests that statutes could simply require that police officers use no more force than necessary in the stop.
     Thus, Dix finds that although all states accept the concept of nonarrest investigatory detentions, little work has been done to clarify the issues surrounding the stops.  Furthermore, the Supreme Court has not provided clear guidance to states attempting to establish parameters for field stops.
     Dix proceeds to explore broader issues surrounding general search and seizure law.  First, Dix finds a need for state lawmakers to create clear limits on police agencies rather than allowing case law to slowly attempt to form comprehensive guidelines.  Secondly, a concern arises in how judicial review will limit the qualification of a detention as a nonarrest investigatory detention.  Characterization of the stop can be done in four ways: 1) a post hoc characterization which evaluates the situation after the results  2) a subjective intention approach that focuses on the police officer's intention in the stop  3) the reasonable perception approach in which the average citizen's perception of the detention is primary or  4) a per se rule for admonitions which would require police to provide information to the suspect.  After Dix discusses the benefits and concerns of each approach, he urges states to address this topic.  Finally, Dix questions whether investigatory detentions are entitled to a lesser form of the Miranda warning.  Although it would be impossible to allow suspects the right to counsel in field stops, states should guarantee that individuals be informed of their right to refuse to answer questions.
     Thus, nonarrest investigatory detentions are a vital tool for law enforcement but the approval of such tools since Terry have created many questions that need to be addressed.  Gaps left by the Supreme Court should be considered by states in order to create a clear policy.  Without such guidelines, the states are open to law enforcement misconduct.

Article Summary by: Corrie Noir
Wake Forest University School of Law 1999