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Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107
Harv. L. Rev. 757 (1994).
Student Review:
After labeling the Fourth Amendment as an embarrassment, Amar
provides an extensive review of the text and history of the Fourth
Amendment, and then offers his suggestions for improvement. The current
decisions of the Supreme Court regarding the Fourth Amendment are
confusing and contradictory, and the Court still has not provided
reasons for the complexity. Amar suggests that the Fourth Amendment is
misunderstood itself, often linked to Criminal Procedure classes when it
instead applies to both civil and criminal law. Teaching the Fourth
Amendment alone also separates it from its connection with other
important constitutional amendments, especially with the Seventh
Amendment. Amar suggest that scholars and the Court return to a review
of the first principles of the Fourth Amendment.
First, Amar asserts that the Fourth Amendment does not require
warrants for all searches and seizures. Amar finds no historical
support that the founders intended a warrant to be necessary for a
reasonable search. The Second Congress allowed arrests without
warrants, searches pursuant to arrests were not challenged, and a
constable who searched without a warrant and actually found stolen goods
could not be challenged. These historical examples demonstrate that
there was not a warrant requirement for all searches. Likewise, in
modern situations such as hot pursuits, consensual searches, and plain
view searches, a strict warrant requirement just does not make common
sense. Thus, these historical and modern examples demonstrate that
warrantless searches are not per se unreasonable.
Secondly, Amar demonstrates that the warrant clause of the Fourth
Amendment was not intended to encourage warrants, but rather to limit
them. Historically, broad warrants were issued by judges providing a
justification for intrusive actions by government officials. Judges
were seen as individuals controlled by the British crown. The remedy
for an unreasonable search was granted by a jury of their peers. Thus,
the language of Fourth Amendment was formed to limit situations in which
warrants could be granted. Early Americans favored a linkage of the
Fourth and Seventh Amendment which allowed a civil jury to address
concerns over illegal searches and seizures.
Furthermore, Amar states that the probable cause standard only
applies to warrants, not all searches and seizures. He points out that
other warrant requirements such as an oath or affirmation was never
applied to all searches and seizures. While some intrusive searches
would need probable cause, other searches (such as a metal detector or
public view searches) do not need a probable cause standard. Rather,
the reasonableness of the search should be the most important factor,
and this standard can be tailored to various situations with different
levels of intrusiveness. Likewise, the Court's exclusionary rule is not
the proper remedy for evidence obtained from unreasonable searches. Amar demonstrates that the development of this rule was confusing and
taken out of its original context, which was to initially prevent the
words of a diary to testify in a criminal case. Instead of retaining
the exclusionary rule, Amar suggests that money damages would be a
better remedy for individuals who are subjected to unreasonable
searches.
Amar's suggestions for a reinterpretation of the Fourth Amendment
include a return to the historical and textual basis of the Fourth
Amendment. A warrant or probable cause should not be the standard for
searches, but rather the central issue should be whether the search was
reasonable. This allows the court to consider the intrusiveness of the
search and use common sense to determine when a search is unreasonable.
Furthermore, the concept of reasonableness should also take into account
other constitutional provisions, so that situations such as a search of
a newspaper should require additional scrutiny. Such an inquiry would
take into account issues of race, class, and sex. Amar also suggests
that the remedy for unreasonable searches should be a suit against the
officer and the government itself. If a search is found unreasonable by
a jury, the government would be liable and forced to monetary damages
(including punitive costs). Amar also envisions class actions and
attorney's fees for plaintiffs. Thus, the common sense of a jury
provides the final measurement of reasonableness.
Article Summary by: Corrie Noir
Wake Forest University School of Law 1999
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