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Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement:
Resuscitating the Fourth Amendment, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 473 (1991).
In this article, Bookspan declares her dissatisfaction with the
current Fourth Amendment law. The Court's emphasis on reasonable
searches has led to a number of exceptions to the warrant requirement,
allowing for warrantless searches of greenhouses, warehouses, and motor
vehicles among others. The lack of clear rules regarding the warrant
requirement and probable cause have left courts, scholars, and police in
confusion. The cause of such chaos is due to the Court's attempt to
include evidence around the exclusionary rule that establishes that all
evidence unconstitutionally obtained is barred. The law states that a warrantless search is unconstitutional unless it fits within an
exception. The problem that exists is that there are now too many
exceptions for the rule to create workable guidelines. Bookspan cites
five different developments in the law that have rendered the current
Fourth Amendment collapse.
First, Bookspan finds that the Court has narrowed the terms
search and seizure so that fewer types of activities fall under the
Fourth Amendment. In Katz v. United States, the Court
established a two part test that first requires a subjective expectation
of privacy and that the expectation must objectively be one that society
recognizes as reasonable. Since this decision, later courts have placed
more emphasis on the second prong of the test and have decided in many
cases expectations of privacy is not reasonable. Since this time, the
Court has decided that a drug-detecting canine sniff or a chemical test
for narcotics does not qualify as a search. Furthermore, using the
justification of society's reasonableness, decisions have limited areas
in which individuals have a valid right of privacy (i.e. not within the
sealed hull of a boat, fenced property, or a greenhouse). Thus by
finding these activities did not constitute a search, the Court was free
to establish that a warrant was unnecessary.
Secondly, the Court has limited who has standing to challenge a
Fourth Amendment violation. While previous decisions have allowed
automatic standing for a alleged Fourth Amendment violation, three
recent decision have overruled the automatic standing rule. Rakas v.
Illinois denied passengers in a car standing, States v. Salvucci
demanded that a legitimate expectation of privacy was required for
standing on Fourth Amendment violations and did not exist in the home of
the defendant's mother, and Rawlings v. Kentucky held that no
legitimate expectation of privacy existed in another individual's
purse. Limiting standing for Fourth Amendment violations allow the
Court to circumvent the exclusionary rule.
Furthermore, the Court in Stone v. Powell has eliminated Fourth
Amendment infringements from constitutional errors worthy of habeas
corpus. Thus, prisoners who have used all of their state appeals can no
longer have their case reviewed by federal courts for Fourth Amendment
violations. Bookspan also finds that the extensive lists of exceptions
to the warrant requirement has punched holes in the protection of the
Fourth Amendment.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Bookspan finds that the
Court's emphasis on the reasonableness test under the Fourth Amendment
is its downfall. By focusing on the overall reasonableness of the
search, courts are free to find that a warrant or probable cause are
only one element of reasonableness to consider. Bookspan finds that the
case of New Jersey v. T.L.O. which held that a warrant was not
needed in a school search, signals the Court's willingness to focus only
on reasonableness in Fourth Amendment analysis. This new policy allows
the Court to find most searches reasonable regardless of a warrant or
probable cause.
Bookspan's solution to this dilemma is for the Court to adopt a
standard in which every warrantless search is presumptively
unreasonable. The government would then have the burden of proof to
demonstrate evidence of a true emergency. Thus, the presumptively
unreasonable standard would eliminate most of the current exceptions to
the Fourth Amendment. This policy would provide clarity for courts and
police alike, and revitalizes the Fourth Amendment.
Article Summary by: Corrie Noir
Wake Forest University School of Law 1999
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