Student Review:

     In this article, Hecker first establishes that minorities, especially African-Americans, are often subjected to a majority of traffic stops and searches by the police.  Hecker believes that the real and perceived inequality in traffic stops destroys the credibility of the criminal justice system and poses one of the most significant problems to the effectiveness of law enforcement.  Selective enforcement of traffic laws occurs most often by drug task forces who use pretextual traffic stops (based on a small traffic infraction) to conduct a plain view search of the vehicle for drugs.  A study done in Volusia County, Florida of 1084 police stops showed that 70% of the vehicles had African-American or Hispanic drivers.  Other studies done in Maryland and New Jersey also demonstrated that minorities were disproportionately stopped for traffic violations by the police.  The question remains, What can be done to prevent pretextual traffic stops that target minority drivers?
      In Whren v. United States, the Supreme Court refused to find that pretextual traffic stops that used race as a factor were in violation of the Fourth Amendment's requirements.  The Whren decision established that pretexual traffic stops were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the police officer had probable cause to believe a traffic violation was taking place.  Anytime an officer could have stopped a motorist, the Fourth Amendment was satisfied. This could have test allows officers to stop motorists for any number of minor traffic violations and increases police discretion.  Hecker finds the Whren decision highly unsatisfactory in that it does not address the problem of police using race in pretextual traffic stops nor does it provide any relief for individuals to seek redress under the Fourth Amendment.
      The author considers other avenues than the Fourth Amendment that can be used to limit pretextual traffic stops.  First, state courts can rely on their own state constitutions and grant citizens greater protection from traffic stops.  However, Hecker finds that most states have recognized the validity of pretextual stops rather than limiting their use.  Secondly, individuals may be able to challenge discrimination in pretextual stops under the Equal Protection Clause.  However, most often the use of race in making traffic stops are often subtle, and discriminatory intent is difficult to establish.  Furthermore, statistical information regarding police stops are unavailable.  Thus, neither state constitutions nor the Equal Protection Clause provide much assistance to end pretextual traffic stops.
      Hecker's solution is to rely on the use of police civilian review boards to regulate and discourage the use of discrimination in pretextual stops.  Civilian review boards can limit police discretion by examining and recommending changes to police policies and practices.  Civilian review boards provide an avenue for citizen complaints and can recognize public concern over abuse of police discretion.  The boards are also able to compile information about pretextual stops, urge the police to maintain records and statistics on traffic stops, and push that written rules are implemented.  Thus, while the Supreme Court and other avenues are unlikely to stop race discrimination in pretextual traffic stops, the use of civilian review boards have the potential to combat the inequality of pretextual traffic stops.

Article Summary by: Corrie Noir
Wake Forest University School of Law 1999