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Christopher Slobogin, State Adoption of Federal Law:
Exploring the Limits of Florida's Forced Linkage Amendment, 39 U. Fla.
L. Rev. 653 (1987).
Student Review:
Slobogin's article concerns the 1983
amendment passed in Florida which mandated that Florida's Constitutional
provisions against unlawful search and seizures be construed in
conformity with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment. Slobogin finds this forced linkage between article I,
section 12 of the Florida Constitution and the Supreme Court's Fourth
Amendment decisions destroys the autonomy of state courts. Rather, Slobogin feels that the amendment should be repealed, or at least
narrowly interpreted to allow state courts to rely on their own
interpretations of search and seizure law.
As long as states adhere to the federal minimum protection under
the law, the states are free to hold higher standards for searches and
seizures. The approach to federal and state relations have undergone
four major historical changes. The first phase was dual federalism when
the Bill of Rights had no application on state courts. State courts
were free to develop their own laws on criminal procedure. Beginning in
the 1960s with the Warren Court, the Supreme Court began to take a much
more powerful role and during this co-option phase, state courts
frequently assumed the same standards as the Supreme Court. The third
phase is labeled New Federalism, from the 1970s until today, in which
state courts feel more free to deviate from federal law while still
meeting the federal minimum. Finally, Slobogin finds a new phase of
forced-linkage developing in which states limit themselves to adhering
to federal constitutional law. This forced-linkage occurs either when
state courts interpret state constitutions only in accordance with
Supreme Court decisions, or as in Florida where amendments to the state
constitution require courts to adopt federal constitution law.
Slobogin finds that the policy of New Federalism bests serves the
states and allows state courts to develop more protective standards than
the Supreme Court. He argues than no more uncertainty would exist than
already developed in criminal procedure. Furthermore, a second layer of
review is not unnecessary because often state history deals with
different interests, the state can only affect itself, and linkage
prevents experimentation in criminal procedure law. Forced linkage
eliminates the states ability to offer its own independent review which
may more clearly reflect state history and local concerns. For these
reasons, the 1983 amendment should be repealed, or at least severely
limited.
Slobogin finds for Florida state courts to be bound to federal
constitutional law, there must first exist a controlling Supreme Court
decision. He points out four different occasions when a Supreme Court
decision would not bind the Florida state courts. These include: 1)
Whether there is not an authoritative opinion of the court, such as a
plurality opinion, court dictum, or when a resolution would require
predictive stare decisis; 2) When a Supreme Court opinion is only
partially based on the Fourth Amendment; 3) When the Supreme Court
provides less protection than other areas of the Florida Constitution or
Florida statutory law; and 4) When the Supreme Court decision has
occurred after the adoption of the 1983 amendment.
Thus, Slobogin urges that the forced linkage amendment which limits
state autonomy be repealed in favor of allowing the state court more
independence in the development of search and seizure law. Without such
a event, Slobogin still urges the courts to use many situations to avoid
the effect of the 1983 amendment and retain a measure of state autonomy.
Article Summary by: Corrie Noir
Wake Forest University School of Law 1999
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