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Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil: Police Lying in
Interrogations, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 425 (1996).
Student Review:
Young's article concerns lies made by police officers in order to
induce confessions from suspects. Rather than viewing police lying as a
necessary evil, Young points out the many evils that result from police
lies, and urges that acceptance of such tactics should not be tolerated.
Young begins by identifying various types of lies used by the
police. Police officers lie about the strength of the case (a
co-defendant has confessed, a witness saw them commit the crime, falsely
assert that fingerprints exist), fabricate evidence (make false
photographs of crime scenes), lie abut culpability (claim that the
victim deserved the crime or that the defendant will receive a reduced
sentence), and police can lie about the circumstances of the
interrogation (impersonate an interrogator or record conversations
between suspects). The cases that Young cites are often shocking, such
as a confession that was found valid after police bought a knife,
created a bloody fingerprint on it, photographed it, and used the
fabricated photo to convince the defendant that his fingerprint had been
identified. Other interrogations upheld by various courts are equally
as startling.
Young discusses the development of confession law beginning with
the original standard of interrogations to demonstrate how the court has
slowly created a less stringent standard for confessions. During
colonial times, the police did not exist. Citizens accused others of
crimes, private bounty hunters collected criminals for rewards, and
magistrates questioned suspects before the court. Having a magistrate
operate as an interrogator lead to little dishonesty because the
questioning was held in public with an officer of the court. Also, the
rules regarding lying in interrogations was surprisingly strict, and the
court invalidated confessions even on such comments as you had better
tell the truth. These high standards for confessions existed until
the nineteenth century until the development of the police system. When
cities began developing their own police, officers took over the
function of detaining and interrogating suspects. Young notes that
behind closed doors, techniques of interrogations changed as well, and
lying to suspects became commonplace. Courts used a test of voluntariness based on the totality of circumstances to determine when a
confession could not be admitted. Over time, state courts grew more and
more lenient in allowing police lying in interrogations. Beginning in
the 1930s, the Supreme Court first addressed confessions in state cases,
and seemed to begin to limit forms of compulsion employed by the
police. However, by the 1960s, the concern of the Supreme Court
changed, and with the Miranda decision, the Court instead began
to focus on the warning of rights during police interrogations. Young
notes that many courts today permit police lying during interrogations.
Young also articulates the many consequences of permitting police
lying. Rather than it being a necessary function, in reality, lying
creates more harms. Lying may limit the evidence that police can
collect for a case. When citizens are lied to by police, they are less
likely to cooperate with investigations. Suspects who feel that they
are being lied to by the police are less likely to have confidence in
the officer, and such lies may produce unreliable evidence. Although
the police may justify their fabrications by believing they are lying to
liars or enemies, this attitude can hinder the investigation.
Furthermore, tolerance of lies by police in interrogation rooms may lead
to lies on a warrant or under oath. Not only do lies harm the
collection of evidence, but they also damage police integrity. Lying
does not establish a fair criminal justice system, and reduces citizens'
faith in the police system.
Young argues although judges often justify police lying by
claiming it is necessary, this is not the case. The argument of
necessity claims than since confessions are so vital to law enforcement,
it must also be necessary to allow police to lie to uncover those
confessions. Although relying on physical evidence and information
requires much more effort from the police than confessions, confessions
are often not necessary for the case. Young recommends that more
efforts should attempt to end police lying in interrogations. She
suggests many remedies such as videotaping interrogations, creating more
administrative regulations, statutes against police lying, or stricter
court scrutiny in excluding confessions. Reducing lying by police
officers in interrogations will once again regain the trust of citizens.
Article Summary by: Corrie Noir
Wake Forest University School of Law 1999
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