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		Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil: Police Lying in 
		Interrogations, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 425 (1996). 
		Student Review: 
		                
		Young's article concerns lies made by police officers in order to 
		induce confessions from suspects.  Rather than viewing police lying as a 
		necessary evil, Young points out the many evils that result from police 
		lies, and urges that acceptance of such tactics should not be tolerated.
		 
		      Young begins by identifying various types of lies used by the 
		police.  Police officers lie about the strength of the case (a 
		co-defendant has confessed, a witness saw them commit the crime, falsely 
		assert that fingerprints exist), fabricate evidence (make false 
		photographs of crime scenes), lie abut culpability (claim that the 
		victim deserved the crime or that the defendant will receive a reduced 
		sentence), and police can lie about the circumstances of the 
		interrogation (impersonate an interrogator or record conversations 
		between suspects).  The cases that Young cites are often shocking, such 
		as a confession that was found valid after police bought a knife, 
		created a bloody fingerprint on it, photographed it, and used the 
		fabricated photo to convince the defendant that his fingerprint had been 
		identified.  Other interrogations upheld by various courts are equally 
		as startling.  
		      Young discusses the development of confession law beginning with 
		the original standard of interrogations to demonstrate how the court has 
		slowly created a less stringent standard for confessions.  During 
		colonial times, the police did not exist.  Citizens accused others of 
		crimes, private bounty hunters collected criminals for rewards, and 
		magistrates questioned suspects before the court.  Having a magistrate 
		operate as an interrogator lead to little dishonesty because the 
		questioning was held in public with an officer of the court.  Also, the 
		rules regarding lying in interrogations was surprisingly strict, and the 
		court invalidated confessions even on such comments as you had better 
		tell the truth.    These high standards for confessions existed until 
		the nineteenth century until the development of the police system.  When 
		cities began developing their own police,  officers took over the 
		function of detaining and interrogating suspects.  Young notes that 
		behind closed doors, techniques of interrogations changed as well, and 
		lying to suspects became commonplace.  Courts used a test of voluntariness based on the totality of circumstances to determine when a 
		confession could not be admitted.  Over time, state courts grew more and 
		more lenient in allowing police lying in interrogations.  Beginning in 
		the 1930s, the Supreme Court first addressed confessions in state cases, 
		and seemed to begin to limit forms of compulsion employed by the 
		police.  However, by the 1960s, the concern of the Supreme Court 
		changed, and with the Miranda decision, the Court instead began 
		to focus on the warning of rights during police interrogations.  Young 
		notes that many courts today permit police lying during interrogations.
		 
		      Young also articulates the many consequences of permitting police 
		lying.  Rather than it being a necessary function, in reality, lying 
		creates more harms.  Lying may limit the evidence that police can 
		collect for a case.  When citizens are lied to by police, they are less 
		likely to cooperate with investigations.  Suspects who feel that they 
		are being lied to by the police are less likely to have confidence in 
		the officer, and such lies may produce unreliable evidence.  Although 
		the police may justify their fabrications by believing they are lying to 
		liars or enemies, this attitude can hinder the investigation.  
		Furthermore, tolerance of lies by police in interrogation rooms may lead 
		to lies on a warrant or under oath.  Not only do lies harm the 
		collection of evidence, but they also damage police integrity.  Lying 
		does not establish a fair criminal justice system, and reduces citizens' 
		faith in the police system.  
		      Young argues although judges often justify police lying by 
		claiming it is necessary, this is not the case.  The argument of 
		necessity claims than since confessions are so vital to law enforcement, 
		it must also be necessary to allow police to lie to uncover those 
		confessions.  Although relying on physical evidence and information 
		requires much more effort from the police than confessions, confessions 
		are often not necessary for the case.  Young recommends that more 
		efforts should attempt to end police lying in interrogations.  She 
		suggests many remedies such as videotaping interrogations, creating more 
		administrative regulations, statutes against police lying, or stricter 
		court scrutiny in excluding confessions.  Reducing lying by police 
		officers in interrogations will once again regain the trust of citizens.
		 
		Article Summary by: Corrie Noir  
		Wake Forest University School of Law 1999  
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