Thanks for the references Andy; when I have time -:( I will check them out. I must "confess" to being very dismissive of post-modernism, so I'm likely to be a recalcitrant who prefers to stay with Feyerabend and Lakatos (and Kuhn) as my points of reference on this. My one reading of Bhaskar--if I am right to see him as in the critical realist camp--hardly persuaded me to accept that school. Cheers, Steve At 14:49 19/10/00 +0100, you wrote: >Steve, > >Many thanks for the reply. > >The 'return to practice' view, now prevalent amongst philosophers of >science, is precisely the relativist view that it is *not* the job of >philosopher to *prescribe* to scientists, to provide a definition of >science, as eg 'producer of falsifiable hypotheses', against which >actual scientific practice must be judged. Rather, a particular >science is what particular scientists do, according to this view. So >what you would 'find strange' doesn't occur. Philosophers of >science do not define science *a priori* at all. Rather they study >the practice of particular sciences, and may attempt to define them >*a posteriori*. Not surprisingly, in the case of neoclassical >economics, they conclude that neo-classical economics has very >little to do with falsifiablity. > >Thus, there is no critical edge to the prevalent philosophy of >science. It is thoroughly 'post-modern', if you like. Lakatos went out >of favour in philosophy of science circles a long time ago; in >economic methodolgy circles (as opposed to circles of practicising >economists) few adherents of Lakatos are left - though there are >some. Have another look at the excellent intro to the Backhouse >collection on all this (there are other useful and more recent >collections which i don't have to hand). > >My own limited knowledge on this comes from my being well >acquainted with critical realism (eg. I'm co-editing a book collection >on CR and Marxism). CR was born in the philosophy of science >discipline as a synthesis of the Popper-Kuhn-Lakatos tradition with >the realist tradition (eg Harre, Hansen, Hesse). It spent its early >years (the 70s) arguing against positivism (but also Feyerabend) >but now spends its time arguing against post-modernism - this >indicates the sea change in the philosophy of science (away from >Popper-Kuhn-Lakatos), and in the social science and humanities >more generally, towards post-modernism. > >I disagree with the 'return to practice' view and with CR, and also >with any 'falsifiability' view, by the way, at least as the term >'falsifiablility' is usually understood. The tension between >prescription and description is a manifestion of the contradiction >between the universal and the particular that drives the dialectic. > >But I remain very interested to find out where other people stand. >Who believes in 'falsifiablity' as a litmus test for science? This is an >important question. For example, the fact that Steve and myself >have very different readings of Capital will be related to our different >readings of the state of play in contemporary philosophy of science. > >Thanks again, > >Andy > > > > > >On 19 Oct 2000, at 22:53, Steve Keen wrote: > >> This will be an almost as brief reply as my previous one, because of other >> time pressures. >> >> I interpret Lakatos' concept of Scientific Research Programs as being >> potentially degenerative as describing the way in which Marxists have >> reacted to the criticisms which have been cast under the rubric of the >> transformation problem: they have forever adjusted the "protective belt" of >> ancillary hypotheses in order to protect what they perceive as the "hard >> core"--being the assertion that labor is the only source of surplus value. >> >> I see Lakatos' concepts as continuing Popper's distinction between science >> and non-science, though in a far more subtle, sophisticated and >> historically accurate form. >> >> I haven't kept up with the philosophy of science since Lakatos--though I >> have read all the references you note below. I dispute that it is Popper's >> litmus test which has been rejected. What has been rejected are his >> concepts of how scientists do and should behave. I would find it strange >> for any philospher of science to define as a science a set of propositions >> which has been designed to be unfalsifiable--though of course adjusting >> ancillary assumptions is a normal part of the development of a SRP. >> >> Steve >> At 11:40 19/10/00 +0100, you wrote: >> >Steve, >> > >> >I ask again, a point of agreement amongst whom? I flatly disagree >> >with you if you say it is agreed by either economic methodologists >> >or by philosophers of science. See for example the well known >> >collection on economic methodology edited by Roger Backhouse, >> >'New directions in economic methodology' (Routledge 1994). But >> >more than that consider the entire development of economic >> >methodology since Blaug's seminal text on the topic. Blaug >> >asserts not just Popper-Lakatos's general view but also the specific >> >one regarding the litmus test. And it is this litmus test, more than >> >anything else, that *has* been rejected by most people in the field. >> >What on earth is the current 'return to practice' if it isn't a rejection >> >of the litmus test? How then can you assert that it (the litmus test) >> >remains a point of agreement? >> > >> >At the very least you must argue for this contentious assertion (one >> >that is incorrect on my view!) >> > >> >Andy >> > >> >PS I have been unable to solve the problem of the 'send reply to' >> >field. Any help on this would be appreciated. >> > >> > >> > >> > >> >------- Forwarded message follows ------- >> >Date sent: Thu, 19 Oct 2000 21:04:54 +1000 >> >To: Andrew@lubs.leeds.ac.uk >> >From: Steve Keen <s.keen@uws.edu.au> >> >Subject: Re: [OPE-L:4155] Who agrees with Popper? [re OPE-L:4154] >> > >> >Popper's theory of how a science does develop and should practice has been >> >rejected since Kuhn. But his litmus test remains a point of agreement. >> > >> >Steve > > Dr. Steve Keen Senior Lecturer Economics & Finance University of Western Sydney Macarthur Building 11 Room 30, Goldsmith Avenue, Campbelltown PO Box 555 Campbelltown NSW 2560 Australia s.keen@uws.edu.au 61 2 4620-3016 Fax 61 2 4626-6683 Home 02 9558-8018 Mobile 0409 716 088 Home Page: http://bus.macarthur.uws.edu.au/steve-keen/
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