In reply to Julian's 4201. I had written, : > P.S. I agree with you on the need for theories and interpretations to be : > susceptible of empirical disconfirmation (though I also think confirming : > evidence can sometimes be meaningful; it is a matter of probabilities). : > Julian asks: : Is this an endorsement of Bayesianism? I think so, but I don't know enough theory to be sure. Julian: "But why only "sometimes" meaningful? (Presumably if evidence is indeed confirmatory it must raise one's degree of belief)." Yes, but it might be a negligible rise, and thus perhaps not meaningful, like the sighting of a black raven as confirmation of "all ravens are black." Andrew Kliman
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