Alejandro wrote in OPE-L 4314 : It might happen that his relation with Hegel was precisely this: he was : attemping to get logic back to his function of "mere" *tool* which perhaps : had being lost in Hegel's hands. (Chris Arthur... Andrew Kliman, help... : please!) FWIW -- I'm not a philosopher -- I think the nature of "logic" underwent a change in Hegel's hands, such that logic is NOT any longer a mere tool. It is no longer subjective, but objective-subjective. Events and ideas have *their own* logic, though thought is needed to reveal that logic to us. And I think Marx's notion of it basically *follows* Hegel's. In the Postface to the 2d German ed. of Capital, Marx talks of the presentation capturing the real movement, the life of the subject matter. He else regularly talks of uncovering the inner connections of things. Where I agree with you is that Marx was generally not deducing results from premises in the linear maneer of the axiomatic method. His goal was to have the life of the subject matter reflected in the ideas. Achieving that would substantiate the categories and starting point. This seems to me also to be Hegelian. Prior to Hume, and then Kant, the belief that the categories of the mind are vehicles of truth wasn't called into question. E.g., Descartes thought he had a secure starting point for knowledge. But Hume and Kant shook all that up. Hegel focused on this, and came up with the solution that the results substantiate the premises. Andrew Kliman
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