Just to reiterate: I am not trying to bring quantum mechanics into value theory. The point here is a general philosophical one (here I draw from a helpful discussion by Grometstein, The Roots of Things: Topics in Quantum Mechanics). The question here is about the nature of the attributes of objects or qualities in general; the specific question is what kind of attribute is value. Until the impact of relativity theory and quantum mechanics, it was tenable to categorize attributes as primary and secondary (so thought Anaxagoras, Galileo, Descartes, Locke); the former was supposed to be a feature which an object possesses independent of an observer. Classic examples were supposed to be mass, position or size. Primary qualities, that is, were thought to be resident within their object; inalienable from it and make up their essence. An observer simply measured or read a primary quality, but the quality is in no sense dependent upon the observer. Secondary qualities arise from the interaction between the object and an observer. Taste and color are typical of this type. Now that distinction has broken down since with relativity theory: mass for example does vary with the relative speed of the object and observer. If every quality is secondary, then the distinction between primary and secondary is simply uninformative. But in *Physics and Philosophy* (as I cited in my second post on money) Heisenberg tried to replace the old distinction of primary and secondary attributes with the idea that qualities of an object are either essential or potential; possessed or latent. With the uncertainty principle latent qualities manifest themselves as clearly present only upon measurement; that is, position and momentum appear as latent qualities.... Now this conceputal innovation is helpful in understanding Marx for whom value is a kind of latent quality of commodities which manifests itself as clearly present only upon successful monetary ex-change or "collapse" onto the money price "vector" (of course not everything which has assumed the commodity form and sold for a price possess the quality of value, but no commodity which has not sold for a price is a--or possesses--value). It thus makes no sense to speak of the valorization of value as parallel to the expansion of money which is simply the necessary (and only) form of appearance of value (though value is necessarily misrepresented by money price). At any rate, value is necessarily represented in money; and value expansion can only obtain in and through money. It follows then (as argued by Alejandro R and Fred in their criticism of standard dualism) that Marx could not have written a "price-free" transformation table demonstrating the valorization of capital over one period in which the "inputs" would be in the form of values rather than money- or cost-prices that determined the initial sum of invested money capital. There is no need (strictly speaking) then to transform the "inputs" from "values" to "prices". All the best, Rakesh
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