Sorry Andy, these responses are so short and inadequate - don't mean to be curt, but I'm on the run.... So appologies in advance... >The 'world' you refer to is that which the thinking head reconstructs >/ appropriates, yes? Thus there is a relationship of 'reconstruction' >between world and thought, it would seem. The notion of >'recontruction' would seem to imply that the elements >reconstructed 'in thought' have a close relationship, an >isomorphism, to the elements of reality that they 'reconstruct'. If I >'reconstruct' a car, eg in a model of a car, a toy car, then both the >original and the recontruction have 4 wheels, engine, etc. Here >'reconstruction' makes sense, and there is a one to one >connection, indeed an isomorphism (identity of shape) between the >reconstructed model car, its various elements, and the real car (its >various elements). Without some such relation, it would seem that >the term 'reconstruction' is difficult to grasp. I don't think I implied any of the above: certainly never said that a theory is a 'reconstruction' of reality. If there is any reconstruction going on in value-form theory, it is a reconstruction of Marxian concepts. On the ontological front, as you know, Chris A has written several superb papers on the connection between Hegelian logic and the inverted world of Capitalism, none of which rely upon (a) a concept of 'reconstruction' in the meanings you set out, or (b) a theory of mind. On the epistemological front, a theory of how theory is constructed (a theory of logic) is not, imo, a theory of mind. >You basically agreed with Feyerabend, no? No. All I did was summarise positions and say, I suppose we could choose this criterion, or I suppose we could choose that criterion, or I suppose we could be incredibly lazy and choose not to choose. Never said I *agree* with this or that - certainly never said 'obvious' solutions (eg Feyerabend's) were the ones anyone should adopt - although it is 'nice' in it's intentions - level playing field of ideas, etc (that there isn't a level playing field of ideas is just one of the immediate criticisms, of course). >And you did this via a >discussion of Lakatos. I didn't discuss Lakatos at all, just stated a well known position and a well known objection to it - didn't say I agreed or disagreed. >What I was inadequately trying to get at is >that you seem to agree with the terms of debate Lakatos and >Feyerabend adhere to. Yet, both thinkers fail to recognise an >objective world against which ideas are judged. Once again my brief set of points stating various positions in philosophy of science doesn't constitute a commitment to a position. The commitments you are attributing to me, I haven't made or defended. >My fear is that an 'undogmatic' blossoming of ideas in the absence >of any objective reality is, in truth, its own opposite, a terrain of >dogmatic assertions each sheltered from criticism in the absence >of recognition of the objective world that should be their criterion. I chose but *one* aspect of Jerry's multi-sided original question, (I'm oversimplifying, sorry Jerry) - this aspect was the sub-question of whether we could *agree* on some set of *criteria* for judging *theories against theories* - other than the razor principle, or by reference to empirical reality? The point of my post was just to say 'probably not'. Hope this clarifies, albeit inadequately. comradely, Nicky ---------------------------------- Nicola Mostyn (Taylor) Faculty of Economics Murdoch University Australia Telephone: 61-8-9385 1130
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