Nicola objects to "independent and dependent variables in a
causal theory," arguing that such cause-and-effect reasoning goes
against Hegelian dialectics as the way of explaining and
comprehending things.
I don't understand why this approach carries any weight.
Doesn't Hegel himself accept cause and effect reasoning? For
example, "... finite things stand to each other as cause and
effect, force and exercise, and when they are apprehended in
these categories, they are known in their finitude." (the
Encyclopedia Logic, section 29) Of course, Hegel is interested in
his Notion or Absolute Idea, which are infinite not finite, and
for this purpose, he argues the inadequacy of cause and effect.
Also, as Hegel moves from comprehending finite things to the
infinite, he goes beyond both "understanding" (what Marxists call
metaphysical thinking, which has its place, too) AND dialectics
to what he calls speculative reason.
In addition, we do not take Marx as an Authority. We must study
and engage in the world today. If we find Marx's concepts useful
in demonstrating how things are constituted, how they move, and
how we can change the world, good. The same criterion would apply
to using Hegel's concepts. That requires that at some point we do
political economy not only philosophy.
So, what's wrong with reasoning by cause and effect, keeping
ourselves aware of how they chain, how things mutually affect
each other, etc.?
Charles Andrews
Web site for my book From Capitalism to Equality is at
http://www.LaborRepublic.org
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Sat Jun 02 2001 - 00:00:08 EDT