From: Christopher Arthur (cjarthur@WAITROSE.COM)
Date: Tue May 25 2004 - 10:23:41 EDT
Jery here is a review I published in Radical Philosophy minus the notes "Bertell Ollman. Dance of the Dialectic: Steps in Marx¹s Method, University of Illinois Press, Urbana and Chicago, 2003. 233 pp. $ 39.95 hb., $ 18.95 pb., 0-252-02832-5 hb., 0-252-07118-2 pb. Bertell Ollman has been a lively presence in the field of Marxian studies for over thirty years. His most distinctive contribution lies in his elucidation of Marx¹s method, specifically dialectics. Here he gives us Œthe best of my life¹s work on dialectics¹. The various chapters are (lightly revised) reproductions of earlier published material: four chapters from his first (and best I think) book Alienation (1971), three from his Dialectical Investigations (1993), plus five more occasional pieces. The whole forms an ideal introduction to his thought for newcomers, and a useful compendium for those renewing their acquaintance with it. Ollman¹s book has two major themes: the philosophy of internal relations (first expounded in Alienation), and the method of multi-variant abstraction (the central chapter of Dialectical Investigations). These I will summarise in a moment; but first let us attend to what Ollman thinks about dialectic in general; one is struck by its epistemological and methodological characterisation: ŒDialectics is a way of thinking that brings into focus the full range of changes and interactions that occur in the world. As part of this, it includes how to organize a reality viewed in this manner for purposes of study and how to present the results of what one finds to other people.¹ (12) Dialectics is a method one Œputs to work¹, not the way reality works, although to be sure it is useful because of the prevalence of Œchanges¹ and Œinteractions¹ in the world. Only in a late chapter does Ollman become self-conscious about this peculiar modality of his dialectic, and make a gesture towards ontology. But much more could be said. Of course Œchange and interaction¹ is a banal phrase in its own. What makes Ollman¹s work interesting is when he insists that these features determine what a thing is. Strictly speaking there are no things, only processes and relations, interactions are Œinneractions¹. So he gives us a full-blown philosophy of internal relations. He introduces this idea with an acute observation on Marx¹s writing, namely the impossibility of finding in it neat definitions, because the meaning of a term shifts with its context. Here is Ollman¹s explanation: ŒThe philosophy of internal relations ... treats the relations in which anything stands as essential parts of what it is, so that a significant change in any of these relations registers as a qualitative change in the system of which it is a part. With relations rather than things as the fundamental building blocks of reality, a concept may vary somewhat in its meaning depending on how much of a particular relation it is intended to convey.¹ (5) This approach certainly clarifies much that is obscure in Marx¹s discourse.# For Ollman it appears all relations are internal relations. (177) This view is implausible; a mind, a society, a solar system, are different realms of being with the Œparts¹ having differing status in relation to the whole. With an all-embracing philosophy of Ollman¹s kind there is a double danger: first, of Œthinning¹ out the concept of internal relation such that it can indeed cover Œeverything¹ at the cost of being uninformative; second, of over-extending the range of a Œthick¹ concept to cases where it does not really apply, at the cost of mysticism. I do not doubt that much of Marx¹s work, especially his Capital, treats with great sophistication totalities characterised by internal relations. But in my opinion this does not derive from a general philosophical position, but from the peculiar character of his object. At all events, given that Œeverything¹ forms a totality, discrimination of parts necessarily involves Œabstraction¹ in a strong sense (a whole constituted by external relations must also be studied through abstracting parts but in this case one simply reads off the relevant unique distinctions from the reality). Ollman considers the chapter on abstraction to be Œthe most important chapter¹ of his book. To think Œchange and interaction¹ in an adequate way requires Œthe process of abstraction¹. (10) Thought must abstract from the whole categories identifying the key relations and these must be capable of prioritising movement over stability and interaction over isolation.# The two aspects of Ollman¹s philosophy are connected insofar as Œit is the philosophy of internal relations that gives Marx both license and opportunity to abstract as freely as he does, to decide how far into its internal relations any particular will extend.... Since boundaries are never given and when established never absolute it also allows and even encourages reabstraction, makes a variety of abstractions possible, and helps to develop his mental skills and flexibility in making abstractions.¹ (71) Ollman distinguishes these conjoint aspects to abstraction: Œextension, level of generality, and vantage point¹. (74) The first refers to the temporal or spatial range covered by the abstraction. The second brings into focus a specific level of generality for treating the material thus designated. The third aspect refers to the perspective on it flowing from the research agenda. Ollman's discussion of abstraction in general and of these three aspects is very useful. It should be taken into consideration by all social scientists aiming to achieve clarity about the salience of their study. Ollman is also certainly correct in pointing to the flexibility and fertility of Marx¹s use of abstraction. But insofar as Ollman¹s concentration is on the methodological process of abstraction in theory, this means the ontological issue of abstraction is relatively neglected. He briefly notes that Marx recognised that there is something strange about capitalism in this respect: ŒAbstractions ... exist in the world. In the abstraction, certain spatial and temporal boundaries and connections stand out, just as others are obscure and even invisible, making what is in practice inseparable appear separately and the historically specific features of things disappear behind their more general form.... Marx labels these objective results of capitalist functioning ³real abstractions² , and it is chiefly real abstractions that incline the people who have contact with them to construct ideological abstractions. It is also real abstractions to which he is referring when he says that in capitalist society ³people are governed by abstractions².¹ (62)# Even here, once again Ollman stresses the epistemological consequences and fails to follow up the significant remark by Marx that Œindividuals are now ruled by abstractions¹.# It is around this issue that the differences between Ollman¹s approach and my own turn. Ollman devotes a chapter to Œa critique of systematic dialectics¹, a view attributed to ŒTom Sekine, Robert Albritton, Christopher Arthur, and Tony Smith¹. (182) He characterises this interpretation of Marx¹s method as follows: Œ(1) that Marx¹s dialectical method refers exclusively to the strategy Marx used in presenting his understanding of capitalist political economy; (2) that the main and possibly only place he uses this strategy is in Capital I; and (3) that the strategy itself involves constructing a conceptual logic that Marx took over in all its essentials from Hegel.¹ (182) Ollman does not deny that this interpretation offers important insights into Marx¹s expositional strategy, but he also wishes to take ŒSystematic Dialectic¹ to task for the following reasons: (1) Marx had other aims in Capital beside the presentation of a categorial dialectic; (2) Marx employs many other strategies of exposition, especially in other parts of his corpus; (3) It is wrong to restrict Marx¹s dialectical method to that of presentation instead of combining ontology, epistemology, inquiry, intellectual reconstruction, exposition, and praxis. (87) Speaking for myself, the short reply to these criticisms is that I have never doubted any of these points. Systematic dialectic addresses itself to a very specific problem: the exposition of a system of categories dialectically articulated. I never said this was all Marx did, or needed to do. However, a longer answer is required to point (3) which in turn refers back to the reasons why exposition is so important, why - apart from the obvious - the focus of research is on Capital, and why Hegel¹s logic is so relevant. It is simply incorrect to state that ontology has been ignored in Systematic Dialectic. Indeed, the guiding principle is the need to identify the logic proper to the peculiar character of the specific object, as Marx himself recommended in his 1843 notes on Hegel. There is no universal method guaranteed to unlock all secrets. Capital is characterised by an ontology peculiar to itself insofar as it moves through abstraction. Theory must follow this real process of abstraction, and elucidate what is negated in it. I argue for the relevance of Hegel¹s logic because capital grounds itself in a process of real abstraction in exchange in much the same way as Hegel¹s dissolution and reconstruction of reality is predicated on the abstractive power of thought. The task of the exposition is to trace capital¹s imposition of abstraction on the real world. Once this has been done it is perfectly possible to change the vantage point and present it as a system of alienation, reification, and fetishism. But, once again, fetishism is real, not just how things are Œviewed¹. (104) Ollman has a distinctive position worthy of attention. Much that he says about the relevance of the philosophy of internal relations to Marx¹s work is certainly illuminating, and much of the methodological advice about the handling of abstraction to be taken on board. But there is also a certain one-sidedness: the pertinence of internal relations is over-generalised, and the discussion of abstraction is primarily from the vantage point of method, whereas Marx¹s ontological insight about the rule of abstractions leads us into a dialectic of capital itself." Chris Arthur 17 Bristol Road, Brighton, BN2 1AP, England
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