From: Hanno Pahl (hanno.pahl@UNI-BIELEFELD.DE)
Date: Tue Jan 18 2005 - 16:04:43 EST
Hi Andy, what concerns my mention of philosophy of mind and systems theory concerning 'emergence': You are exactly right: The conception of emergence doesn't take the step to - for example - suppose that a 'neuron-in-general' has become an independent reality. But I recently read in a German text about emergence in the context of the philosophy of mind about a concept that was called macrodetermination. It seems that this is used to describe the contrary 'top-down'-perspective, e.g.: How does the emergent structure or the whole - which is though to be more than the sum of its parts or elements - 'retroacts' (?) on the level of the parts/elements. In another context this was used as a description for e.g. Wallersteins assumption of the constitution of a capitalist world system. Once a global division of labour is constituted via the subordination of production under the global circulation sphere, the formerly national and separated divisions of labour are transformed into internal moments of the global division of labour. This is why Wallerstein has related different sorts of national economies functionally along the line these play for the reproduction of the capitalist world system (centre-semi-periphery-periphery). (I mention this example only to clarify the concept of macrodetermination). My interest in these things comes from my PhD-thesis, because here I compare the Marxian conception of economy with those conception found in Niklas Luhmanns theory of social systems (which is quite popular here in Germany). Luhmann regards the economy as a heterarchic system what implies that there is no unity, centre or apex of this system. In contrast, Luhmann states, that in a hierarchy a centre or apex controls the whole system or proclaims to 'be' the whole system (in the sense of representation). One could think here of lords within feudalism or bureaucratic control-units in traditional state-socialism. But for the case of the heterarchic structure of the monetary (capitalistic) economic system Luhmann makes two exceptions: The central-bank as well as the financial markets are regarded as parts of the system that nevertheless – ‘to a certain degree’ – are thought to represent the unity of the system by themselves (but Luhmann has no value-theory and this assumptions on this point remain somewhat ambiguous). So far, best wishes, Hanno My grasp of the general notion of 'emergence' is that it does not entail > the peculiarity that a general notion gains independent existence. To be > sure 'mind' in some sense is emergent from 'neurons', but this does not, > according to the notion of emergence I am familar with, entail that a > general notion, say 'neuron-in-general', has become an independent > reality. > The notion of 'emergence', as I employ it, may be necessary but not > sufficient to capture the logical structure to which you refer. I'd be > very > interested to read more about your views on this. ----- Original Message ----- From: <Gerald_A_Levy@MSN.COM> To: <OPE-L@SUS.CSUCHICO.EDU> Sent: Tuesday, January 18, 2005 3:07 PM Subject: [OPE-L] capital in general as a real existence > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Andrew Brown" <A.Brown@lubs.leeds.ac.uk> > To: <Gerald_A_Levy@MSN.COM> > Sent: Tuesday, January 18, 2005 5:00 AM > Subject: FW: [OPE-L] capital in general as a real existence > > > Hello Hanno, > > I agree with Michale L regarding. the real existence of > capital-in-general. > > You also mentioned: > > > > > > Helpful might be the following: As far as I can see, as well in > the > philosophy of mind as in recent sociological systems theory (more popular > over here!), one would possibly mark the logical structure of these > Marxian > phrasings as ‘emergent’. While one could regard the commodities or the > single capitals as elements, money and capital in general would possibly > be > interpreted as categories on the systems-level or the whole. > > > > Any hints about this? > > > > My grasp of the general notion of 'emergence' is that it does not entail > the peculiarity that a general notion gains independent existence. To be > sure 'mind' in some sense is emergent from 'neurons', but this does not, > according to the notion of emergence I am familar with, entail that a > general notion, say 'neuron-in-general', has become an independent > reality. > The notion of 'emergence', as I employ it, may be necessary but not > sufficient to capture the logical structure to which you refer. I'd be > very > interested to read more about your views on this. > > > > Many thanks, > > > > Andy >
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