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Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil: Police Lying in Interrogations, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 425 (1996).

Student Review:

              

Young's article concerns lies made by police officers in order to induce confessions from suspects.  Rather than viewing police lying as a necessary evil, Young points out the many evils that result from police lies, and urges that acceptance of such tactics should not be tolerated.
      Young begins by identifying various types of lies used by the police.  Police officers lie about the strength of the case (a co-defendant has confessed, a witness saw them commit the crime, falsely assert that fingerprints exist), fabricate evidence (make false photographs of crime scenes), lie abut culpability (claim that the victim deserved the crime or that the defendant will receive a reduced sentence), and police can lie about the circumstances of the interrogation (impersonate an interrogator or record conversations between suspects).  The cases that Young cites are often shocking, such as a confession that was found valid after police bought a knife, created a bloody fingerprint on it, photographed it, and used the fabricated photo to convince the defendant that his fingerprint had been identified.  Other interrogations upheld by various courts are equally as startling.
      Young discusses the development of confession law beginning with the original standard of interrogations to demonstrate how the court has slowly created a less stringent standard for confessions.  During colonial times, the police did not exist.  Citizens accused others of crimes, private bounty hunters collected criminals for rewards, and magistrates questioned suspects before the court.  Having a magistrate operate as an interrogator lead to little dishonesty because the questioning was held in public with an officer of the court.  Also, the rules regarding lying in interrogations was surprisingly strict, and the court invalidated confessions even on such comments as you had better tell the truth.    These high standards for confessions existed until the nineteenth century until the development of the police system.  When cities began developing their own police,  officers took over the function of detaining and interrogating suspects.  Young notes that behind closed doors, techniques of interrogations changed as well, and lying to suspects became commonplace.  Courts used a test of voluntariness based on the totality of circumstances to determine when a confession could not be admitted.  Over time, state courts grew more and more lenient in allowing police lying in interrogations.  Beginning in the 1930s, the Supreme Court first addressed confessions in state cases, and seemed to begin to limit forms of compulsion employed by the police.  However, by the 1960s, the concern of the Supreme Court changed, and with the Miranda decision, the Court instead began to focus on the warning of rights during police interrogations.  Young notes that many courts today permit police lying during interrogations.
      Young also articulates the many consequences of permitting police lying.  Rather than it being a necessary function, in reality, lying creates more harms.  Lying may limit the evidence that police can collect for a case.  When citizens are lied to by police, they are less likely to cooperate with investigations.  Suspects who feel that they are being lied to by the police are less likely to have confidence in the officer, and such lies may produce unreliable evidence.  Although the police may justify their fabrications by believing they are lying to liars or enemies, this attitude can hinder the investigation.  Furthermore, tolerance of lies by police in interrogation rooms may lead to lies on a warrant or under oath.  Not only do lies harm the collection of evidence, but they also damage police integrity.  Lying does not establish a fair criminal justice system, and reduces citizens' faith in the police system.
      Young argues although judges often justify police lying by claiming it is necessary, this is not the case.  The argument of necessity claims than since confessions are so vital to law enforcement, it must also be necessary to allow police to lie to uncover those confessions.  Although relying on physical evidence and information requires much more effort from the police than confessions, confessions are often not necessary for the case.  Young recommends that more efforts should attempt to end police lying in interrogations.  She suggests many remedies such as videotaping interrogations, creating more administrative regulations, statutes against police lying, or stricter court scrutiny in excluding confessions.  Reducing lying by police officers in interrogations will once again regain the trust of citizens.

Article Summary by: Corrie Noir
Wake Forest University School of Law 1999

 

 
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