Re Gil 4250:
Gil,
First of all, I'm very sorry if in my preceding post I wrote some words
that can be interpreted as dismishing you or your work. It was clearly not
my intention and I hope this doesn't hinder our dialogue. I have to make an
effort to write in English and cannot give a lot of nuances to my expressions.
Regarding the "kind of disciple" expression: I'm interested in the source
of the ideas and methods people currently use to interpret Marx. Your
thought experiment seems to me coming from the leit motiv of the literature
originated in the authors in question.
The idea that we may have a theoretical construction which "would render
reference to labor values superfluous even though Marx's substantive claims
about the exploitative nature of capitalist profits are affirmed" is
certainly not new.
It was expressed in very clear terms by Tugan Baranowsky 100 years ago, and
he did provide a variant of such theoretical construction at that time.
This was framed within an important intellectual current of the epoch in
which neo-Kantianism had a strong influence on Socialdemocratic
intellectuals. So, I'm not "charging" you of this. (BTW, this is not a
court!) Simply, I'm trying to understand the position of your proposed
thought experiment in the set of ideas. The expression "kind of disciple"
is indeed not appropiate and I apologise for it.
Gil in 4250:
>Your charge is demonstrably invalid, Alejandro. I made no such "hidden
>assumption," but rather explicitly stated a series of theoretical
>conditions that, arguably, would render reference to labor values
>superfluous even though Marx's substantive claims about the exploitative
>nature of capitalist profits are affirmed. That was the whole point of the
>thought experiment, to ask whether rejecting the relevance of labor value
>magnitudes is *necessarily* tantamount to rejecting "Marx's theory of the
>capitalist mode of production," as Paul Z.'s post suggests.
My reply:
I think (correct me if I'm wrong) that what you understand in the preceding
paragraph for "labor values" are the solution of a system of simultaneous
equations as, for example, the systems presented by Morishima in the first
pages of his famous book. If so, I'm not convinced at all that those
magnitudes are a faithful formalization of what Marx refers as "labor" or
"value" in, for example, Ch. 1 of Capital.
However, it's quite possible that you think that they are THE formalization
of Marx's values and, then, when you seek to devise a thought experiment
aimed at rejecting "the relevance of labor value", you are looking to, say,
"reform" *what you think* is Marx's theory. The purpose would be to take
out such "cumbersome epicycles". If I'm not misinterpreting you, I'd say
that those "Morishima-like labor values" are Marx's values.
I think that in Marx's "theory of the capitalist mode of production" makes
no sense to take out labor magnitudes which are the "substance of value",
although it's possible that in a Morishima-like theory this makes sense.
However, it's not Morishima who is "at stake" but Marx, according to your
references to his work.
Yet, regarding my interpretation of Marx's work I'd argue that your thought
experiment makes no sense because his specific subject of inquiry is a
human society in which individuals spend their labor power in order to
reproduce themselves in a given natural enviroment and with generalized
"private exchange" --which means that the product of their labor are in
general commodities.
Marx's investigation doesn't deal with whatever self-reproducing productive
organism (e.g. a beehive or a colony of bacteria) but with that specific
one. If this is Marx's subject of inquiry, I don't see the point in
proposing a theory in which a central *fact* of this reality such "labor
values" (and I understand for "labor value" the *real* objectified social
expenditure of labor power done in a given time) is taken out of the
picture. For me, these magnitudes are observable data belonging to the
object of research itself, not "derived" magnitudes.
Gil in 4250:
>And you would
>look in vain through the entire writings of Sombart
>and Bernstein to find the set of theoretical conditions that I explicitly
>invoke in steps (1) -(3). So whatever it is I'm doing, I'm not not
>affirming their particular arguments, or acting as any "kind" of their
>disciple, although our conclusions might look the same.
My reply:
Again, sorry for those words.
Alejandro in 4244:
>>"Labor magnitudes" however are not "theoretical entities" but real,
>>observable, expenditures of human labor power. It's a matter of fact that,
>>right now, people work and this could be *observed* and accounted for.
Gil in 4250:
>I agree that expenditures of human labor power are both real and
>observable, but this statement is irrelevant to the point I'm making.
My reply:
It's irrelevant only if you think that "labor values" are something else
than real and observable expenditures of human labor power objectified in
the commodities. For example, if you think that are the solution of a
system of simultaneous equations, then the statement is irrelevant. But I
don't think so. I do think that "labor values" are real, observable
*social* expenditures of human labor power. They can be statistically
measured and they don't depend on whatever "equilibrium" condition or
"theoretical" model. They are factual data of the theory, not a
"theoretical construction". This is why in my interpretation of Marx's
theory, it would make no sense to show that such relevant *facts* are, or
can be, "superfluous". If you take out this of this subject of inquiry,
what is left is not a the human society's productive organism but a
*natural* self reproducing productive organism in which I don't have
interest right now.
Gil in 4250:
> With
>respect to my step (1), you don't need to calculate or invoke embodied
>labor values of commodities to state that there are "real, observable
>expenditures of human labor power."
My reply:
I don't need (or want!) to "calculate... embodied labor values", as
presummably you "calculate" them. (BTW, you don't define "embodied labor
values" and seem to believe that everybody shares what is your
intrepretation of these words.) I don't think that Marx's theory, as it is
expounded in Chapter 1, presents such "calculations". He simply presents
the "substance of value" as a result of a real, observable, social
expenditure of labor time quite independently of any "equilibrium"
condition such as that embedded in the "calculation", e.g. Morishima proposes.
Gil in 4250:
>For example, this statement can, and
>routinely is, expressed in neoclassical theory, which of course makes no
>use of Marxian labor values.
My reply:
Again, what do you mean here for "Marxian labor values"?? I think there is
not an universal agreement about the meaning of this.
Neoclassical theory can express this statement ("expenditures of human
labor power are both real and observable") because the theory seeks to
refer somehow to the the capitalist economy and in the capitalist economy
there is indeed an expenditure of human labor power. Both, Ptolemaic and
Copernican astronomers refer to the planets... even the Maya astronomers
referred to them although in their theory they were gods, but certainly
*visible* gods.
Gil in 4250:
>And under the conditions of my step (3), you
>don't need to calculate the traditional Marxian rate of exploitation in
>order to establish a result that is logically equivalent to exploitation in
>Marx's sense of the term.
Alejandro in 4244:
>>This
>>is as real as the expenditure of electricity, oil, flour or mustard that is
>>taking place. In this sense, "labor magnitudes" are not something from
>>which one simply decide to "dispense with", as you suggest. They are not
>>the epycicles but the planets themselves that we are observing, i.e. they
>>are data of the theory, not a "theoretical" (in the sense of imaginary)
>>construction.
Gil in 4250:
>First, note that I likened *commodity labor values*, not expenditures of
>human labor power, to Ptolemaic epicycles, and your comments here do not
>address invoke commodity labor values one way or the other. So your
>comments *necessarily* don't engage my specific point you excerpted above.
My reply:
Notice, first of all that, at the end of your post you wrote:
"Wouldn't it be fetishistic to insist on the necessity of labor magnitudes
to Marxian theoretical discourse under the conditions specified in steps
(1) - (3)"
Here you refers simply to "labor magnitudes", associating them to a
"fetishistic" attitude! It seems to me that this is in line with your
other, "epicycle" analogy: imaginary constructions that even become "fetishs".
But, the problem again is that you *believe* that everybody define "labor
values" in the same way as you do. But this is not the case. For me,
according to Marx comodity labor values are simply the objectification (or
cristallization) of a social expenditure of labor power. I don't find what,
I pressume, is your definition of "commodity labor value" in Marx text.
Certainly, as I understand these magnitudes, they are neither Ptolemaic or
Marxian epicycles nor "fetishs", i.e. Maya gods!!!
Gil in 4250:
>Furthermore, you clearly don't need to calculate commodity labor values to
>make your comment, per my step (1), and given the conditions stipulated in
>my step (3), the connection between expenditures of *surplus* labor and
>capitalist profit is *implied by* a more basic condition. So by
>construction there is no need to determine these magnitudes in order to
>make a point logically tantamount to Marx's critique of capitalism.
My reply:
Again, I don't need to "determine" anything assuming odd things, such
equilibrium, H-S conditions and so for. I think that we only need to
"account for" or "write down" those magnitudes. It's a statistical or
social accounting problem, not a "general equilibrium" exercise. Andean
societies made (and still make in some places) such accounting of the human
labor time they spend in getting their products. (See Victor Murra, The
Economic Structure of Inka State, a fascinating book.) This is the kind of
"calculation" I think Marx presents in Chapter 1, and this is the *real*
calculation what is behind "labor values". His theory is about how is this
real calculation done in a society in which "private exchange" prevails.
In such context, your thought experiment makes no sense to me. If I'm
interested in investigating how a human society reproduces itself in a
natural enviroment in a given historic time, the expenditure of its labor
power it's a central quantitative datum I'm interested in. A thought
experiment proposing to consider this information "superfluous" sounds to
me as proposing to people whose subject of inquiry is the solar system a
thought experiment in which the planets are "irrelevant". Or, in Einstein's
train, to assume that time doesn't elapse, or that the train is stopped, or
that there is no bulb in the lamp, or that the watches are broken.
Gil in 4250:
> And on
>this point, I note the simple fact that workers labor is insufficient of
>itself to establish the existence of capitalist profit or exploitation;
My reply:
May you give us your definition of "capitalist profit"?
Gil in 4250:
>you need something else.
My reply:
I'm sure you need natural conditions.
Gil in 4250:
>But if this "something else" *implies* the existence
>of surplus labor translated into surplus value, then you could in principle
>refer to this "something else" without needing to invoke or calculate the
>labor-denominated magnitudes.
My reply:
So, probalby you are thinking that this "something else" is the surplus
product, as Tugan did. If this is the case, I'm sure your theory of
explotation can be applied to a wild beehive in which there is no human
labor at all. If there is surplus-honey, certainly there will be "surplus
value".
But, probalby, I'm not understanding what you mean, so please explain.
Alejandro in 4244:
>>Whether or not you include "labor magnitudes" in your "series of
>>hypotheticals", it remains a coarse fact of this society that people spend
>>their labor power in order to reproduce themselves.
Gil in 4250:
>Indeed so. But again, you don't need to calculate labor values to make
>this point, and you don't need (under the conditions of step (3), subject
>to the minor caveats in step (2)) to calculate a rate of exploitation as
>Marx defines it to make the same critique as Marx makes when he states that
>capitalist profit is based on exploitation of workers free in the double
sense.
My reply:
I don't reply to this because I'll repeat myself.
Gil in 4250:
>If you're saying that reference to labor magnitudes is important for
>heuristic or rhetorical reasons,
My reply:
Neither "heuristic" nor "rhetorical" reasons. Simply, factual, statistical,
accounting reasons of the human productive organism.
Gil in 4250:
>well, I won't necessarily disagree, but
>that's beside the point of my post, which deals solely with the *logical*
>status of labor-denominated magnitudes in Marx's theory of the capitalist
>mode of production.
My reply:
As you understand it! In Marx's theory "labor denominated magnitudes" have
not a "logical" status if you understand for "logical status" something
like that they should be "derived". They are not "derived", they are *data*
of the specific subject of inquiry. In a theory about heart attacks, the
heart is not "derived" within a "model", it is what we are observing and
trying to understand.
Alejandro in 4244:
>>The intepretation you
>>follow is a result of the idealist revision of Marx's theory of value done
>>by neo-Kantians at the end of XIX century.
Gil in 4250:
>Again, your charge is demonstrably invalid. First, I am not suggesting or
>invoking any "revision", idealist or otherwise, in Marx's theory of
>*value*, I'm suggesting that his critical theory of the capitalist mode of
>production does not depend substantively on his theory of (labor) value.
My reply:
Perhaps you don't want to see this as a "revision" but, would you accept
that you are proposing a "reform" of Marx's theory? In any case, I don't
see what is the point in linking this with Marx's theory in this way. It's
clear that he used, let's say, a "theory of labor value". What were his
reasons is irrelevant. Now, you can propose *another* theory (one of whose
precedents is Marx's) in which the "theory of labor value" is not included.
And that's it all!! Indeed, Tugan, who clearly argues in the same line as
you regarding this point, precisely establishes that he is presenting
*another* theory, different from Marx, although acknowledges his influence.
He even considers his theory as superior as Marx's.
Gil in 4250:
>Second, I'm not "interpreting" anything;
My reply:
Sorry, Gil. Nobody who works on a theory such as Marx's is more (or less)
than an interpreter. I've shown above that, in fact, you work with
definitions (e.g. "Marxian labor values") that in fact are interpretations.
You cannot claim that they are not an *interpretations* simply because
you're not Marx, you are not the author of the orignial theory we're
discussing.
Gil in 4250:
>I'm explicitly stating theoretical
>conditions that arguably render reference to labor-denominated magnitudes,
>particularly commodity labor values and the value rate of exploitation,
>superfluous. Third, my construction is clearly not "idealist", since it
>invokes *exactly the same* real, historically given class conditions
>posited by Marx in Volume I of Capital, so it can't be any more "idealist"
>than Marx's.
My reply:
The purpose of your thought experiment is quite similar to Tugan own
explicit intentions regarding Marx's theory. Tugan was a Kantian. Kant was
an "idealist" thinker. My precise reference to "idealism" in this case
refers to the conception of labor value which some of those authors defined
as a "mental construction" or an "ideal magnitude", having a clear
influence of Kant in this respect: value would be an ideal *creation* of
the thinking subject, not an observable objective reality. The conception
of "labor value" as the result of an ideal equilibrium state might be
another specific development of this general philosophical position.
Gil in 4250:
>Finally, I did not derive the thought experiment from the
>theoretical postulates of any Kantians, neo- or otherwise, so it cannot be
>"result" of something you think that neo-Kantians did at the end of the
>19th century.
My reply:
Sure. But perhaps you're *indirectly *influenced by those authors, and you
haven't yet critically review the sources of your own thought regarding
these matters. For example, why do you conceive "value" as you do? Who are
the authors that, according to you, have given the definition of "Marxian
labor values" you support? Who are the authors who have influenced those
authors? Don't you find interesting that the purpose of your thought
experiment is quite similar to what one can read in Tugan's books? The
problem with all this is that the literature is so extensive that, at this
point, one cannot be sure who are the ultimate source of what one is
defending.
Gil in 4250:
>Finally, name-calling is not the same thing as logically engaging an
>argument, so calling me someone's "kind of disciple",
My reply:
Again, sorry for this. It was a mistake on my part, and I hope you'd excuse
me.
Gil in 4250:
>or calling my thought
>experiment "a result of the idealist revision of...[etc] by neo-Kantians"
>is necessarily irrelevant in addition to being demonstrably invalid.
My reply:
I think I have explained better what I meant.
Gil in 4250:
>For
>example, if I returned the favor by saying that your comments were "for
>sure an evocation of the obscurantist strain of postbellum romantic Marxism
>espoused by Bombstart and Sternbean," would you think that I've engaged
>your argument?
My reply:
No. Of course not. Now, when I wrote "idealism" or "Kantism" I didn't mean
something as "obscurantism". Kantism is a very important philosophical
position that, it's easy to check, had a strong influence in the early
discussions on Marx's value theory. So, it influenced indirectly the whole
subsequent discussion in matters as central as the academically accepted
definition of "Marxian value". I use "Kantism" here as a quite technical
term, not as an insult as your proposed adjective for me: "obscurantist".
My lack of ability writing in English prevent me to put the term as what in
fact is: a technical term and, unfortunately, you read it as an insult, but
it's not.
I apologize again and I hope you don't think that I'm an "obscurantist"
simply because I don't hold the same interpretation of Marx's theory as
yours. I hope also that you don't consider people who think that "labor
value magnitudes" in Marx theory are "relevant" as "obscurantists".
Gil in 4250:
>If not, then considerations of efficiency, if nothing else,
>might suggest the future avoidance of argument ad hominem.
My reply:
I don't think that the exploration of the sources of our own thinking is
synonymous to making "argument ad hominem". But if I made such an argument,
I'm sorry.
Alejandro Ramos
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